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Abstract
This thesis explores three aspects of the coexistence of governments and markets from
an optimal policy point of view.
In chapter 1, I study how the presence of financial markets shapes the government's
ability to redistribute. Individuals do not, constrain consumption to equal their net-
of-tax income every period, but instead use markets to allocate their resources over
time. This restricts the set of policy instruments available to the government. At the
same time, however, markets enable agents to enter long-term consumption commit-
ments. Changing these contracts is costly. These potential default costs mitigate the
government's ex-post incentives to renege on the promised tax schedule, and therefore
provide a coninitment device for the government. In that sense, financial markets
may facilitate rather than hinder redistribution.
In chapter 2, I present a rationale for corporate income taxes to discriminate between
debt and equity financing. For risk-averse entrepreneurs, equity generates more sur-
plus than debt, because it provides financing and insurance. A government seeking to
extract surplus from entrepreneurs would naturally tax equity-generated income more
than debt-generated income. Moreover, in the presence of private information, the
government can use taxes to discriminate between different types of entrepreneurs.
This degree of freedom allows a manipulation of the relevant incentive constraints,
and an increase in overall efficiency. The optimal non-linear tax schedule to achieve
the desired discrimination is isomorphic to one that taxes debt-generated income at
a lower rate than equity-generated income.
In chapter 3, I explore how fast people adapt to institutional change. I study the
differential reaction of former East and West Germans to a series of health care re-
forms. Along with the decrease in coverage under the public health insurance, former
East Germans were significantly less likely to sign complementary insurance contracts
in the private market. I show that the differential uptake rates of additional insur-
ance are consistent with a model in which agents learn over time that institutions
have changed and they are now responsible for optimizing their coverage. Thus, I
provide evidence for the existence of a substantial transition period in the individual
adaptation to new institutions.
Thesis Supervisor: Daron Acemoglu
Title: Elizabeth and James Killian Professor of Economics
Thesis Supervisor: Ivin Werning
Title: Professor of Economics
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Chapter 1
Financial Markets as a
Commitment Device for the
Government
How does the presence of financial markets shape the government's ability
to implement social redistribution? Individuals do not constrain consump-
tion to equal their net-of-tax income every period, but instead use financial
markets to allocate their resources over time. Thus, optimal redistributive
policy ought to take agents' involvement in financial markets into account.
From an allocative point of view, it restricts the set of policy instruments
available to the government. At the same time, however, financial mar-
kets enable agents to borrow against their promised income and enter
long-term consumption commitments. At any point in time, changing
these contracts is costly. These potential default costs mitigate the gov-
ernment's ex-post incentives to renege on the promised tax schedule, and
therefore provide a commitment device for the government. I show that
whenever default costs are positive, the government is able to commit to
a schedule that only pools some agents of similar type together. In that
sense, financial markets may facilitate rather than hinder redistribution.
1.1 Introduction
In the presence of private information, the ability of a government to implement so-
cial redistribution depends crucially on its power to commit to future policy. This
paper identifies a mechanism by which the existence of markets, and in particular
financial markets, may enhance a government's ability to commit, and thus facilitate
redistribution across society. Financial markets provide an opportunity for agents
to enter long-term consumption commitments, and to borrow against their expected
future income. Changing consumption plans and defaulting on loans is costly. A
government choosing policy sequentially has to take the continuation value of agents'
contracts into account: Deviation from previous announcements may lead to costly
default. I show that any such default costs alter the government's ex-post incentives
to renege on the promised transfer scheme and thereby effectively provide a commit-
ment device for the government.
In market economies, individuals typically do not constrain their consumption to
equal net-of-tax income every period. Instead, they use financial markets to allo-
cate resources over time. allowing them to make long-term consumption plans. For
instance, the ability to take out a mortgage enables individuals to live in a house
that reflects their life-time income rather than in a rental unit that reflects their
present disposable income every period. At any point in time, when re-optimizing re-
distributive policy, the government needs to take agents' consumption commitments
into account. If agents end up with less net income than they expected, they have to
adjust their consumption plans downward. Whenever agents have entered long-term
commitments. such adjustments are costly. For example, defaulting on a mortgage
may trigger costs of very diverse nature: A foreclosed house often does not sell for
the same amount as it was worth to the original owner. Administration of defaults is
costly. But also non-pecuniary losses may occur: When agents have to move out of
the house they grew attached to, they may suffer further disutility. Chetty and Szeidl
(2007) report that nearly 65% of the average US household's budget is allocated to
consumption commitments that cannot be adjusted costlessly. Such commitments
would not be possible without access to financial markets. In this paper, I show that
the ability of agents to enter consumption commitments, rather than just the plain
opportunity to allocate resources over time, is what makes the existence of financial
markets valuable for the government. Precisely because agents enter long-term com-
mitments that cannot costlessly be adjusted, the government may gain the ability
to commit to not changing the promised transfer scheme. Therefore, markets may
in fact facilitate rather than hinder redistribution. The paper thus provides a new
perspective on the concept of a social market economy, where markets play a crucial
role for redistributive policy.
I consider a deterministic two-period endowment economy, where agents receive het-
erogeneous endowments every period. Income types are persistent and are private
information. Individual income increases over time, so that every agent would like
to smooth consumption by transferring resources from period 2 to period 1. More-
over, a benevolent government would like to redistribute across agents. In a seminal
contribution, 1\irrlees (1971) established that when the individual ability to generate
income is private information, optimal redistributive policy needs to trade off alloca-
tive efficiency against information rent extraction. In the presented environment, a
benevolent government with an exogenous commitment device can use a fully sep-
arating transfer scheme to implement this optimal trade-off between efficiency and
equity: Analogous to Mirrlees' (1971) "efficiency at the top" result, at the constrained
efficient allocation, only agents of the highest type receive perfectly smooth consump-
tion. The government uses the degree of consumption smoothing as an incentive for
agents to reveal their income type truthfully and to contribute to social redistribu-
tion. When agents are able to use a financial market to borrow against their future
income, every agent gains the opportunity to smooth his income perfectly over time.
The government with ex-ante commitment thus finds itself unable to implement the
constrained efficient allocation, where it could use the degree of smoothing as an in-
centive for truthful revelation. Consequently, less redistribution is implemented. In
this situation, it is irrelevant whether or not agents enter long-term consumption com-
mitments. It is only the allocative aspect of agents contracting in the financial market
that constrains the set of policy instruments available to the government. When the
government has an exogenous commitment device, the existence of markets may thus
hinder redistribution.1
On the contrary, I argue that a government that cannot commit ex-ante to future
policy may gain from the existence of a financial market. Roberts (1984) was the first
to show that lack of commitment in dynamic taxation settings with private informa-
tion may lead to a government not being able to implement any social redistribution.
Analogously, in the economy presented here, when policy can be chosen sequentially
over time, the government has an incentive to use the information about agents gath-
ered in the past to achieve a better redistributive outcome ex-post. Agents anticipate
this behavior. The resulting time-consistency constraint leads to the severely ineffi-
cient outcome of no social redistribution as well as almost no smoothing of individual
consumption over time.2 In this case, the government may in fact gain from agents'
involvement in a financial market. When agents pledge their income in a private con-
tract and enter a long-term consumption commitments, deviating from past policy
announcements may not be optimal for the government anymore, despite its desire
to redistribute. Depending on how many agents would have to default on their debt,
the associated cost may be too high to justify any welfare gains from additional redis-
tribution. I show that whenever default is costly, the government is effectively able
to commit at least to a partially separating transfer schedule. Here, it is the con-
sumption commitment characteristic of agents' contracts rather than the allocative
aspect that has a favorable effect for the government's ability to effectively commit
to future policy. The presence of financial markets and agents' involvement therein
enables the implementation of social redistribution.
'Many authors have considered environments in which agents cannot only contract with a principal.,
but also in anonymous outside markets that make it harder to extract information from the agents
truthfully. See for example Hammond (1987) for a general treatment or Golosov and Tsyvinsky
(2007) for a more recent example from the dynamic public finance literature.2See for example Golosov et al. (2006) for a derivation of this phenomenon in a general setting.
As the main result, I derive a simple condition that links the size of the default costs
and the concavity of the utility function to the degree of separation a government
is able to commit to. Intuitively, this condition equalizes the marginal benefit from
additional redistribution toward the low end of the type distribution to the marginal
cost due to default. The larger the default costs are, given the concavity of utility, the
more separation and so the more social redistribution is possible. Conversely, for fixed
default costs, a more concave utility function makes less separation possible, because
it increases the ex-post welfare gain from redistribution across agents. The financial
market effectively provides the government with a device for limited commitment, i.e.
with the power to commit to not exploit a limited amount of information.
Moreover, the derived results provide insights into the form of partial separation
that emerges at the optimum. If the government is allowed to randomize transfers
between seemingly identical agents, the optimal allocation is such that agents are per-
fectly separated below a cutoff type and completely pooled above. The government
collects perfect information about agents up to a threshold type chosen according to
how much separation it can commit to, and simply pools together all higher income
types. On the contrary, if the government is constrained to comply with horizontal eq-
uity, agents are optimally pooled together in groups throughout the type distribution.
The resulting transfer schedule then has a "tax bracket" structure. The government
collects coarse information over the complete type distribution, higher default costs
allow for more and smaller brackets, so that more detailed information is collected.
In summary, this paper identifies a mechanism by which the economic environment a
government operates in can provide a potential commitment device that does not rely
on reputational considerations or political constraints and works in a finite horizon.
Thereby, my results help reconcile the observation of policies that are suggestive of
governments being able to commit, even though there is no apparent commitment
device. In that sense, this paper provides a new perspective on the concept of a social
market economy, where the presence of well-functioning markets plays a crucial role
for social redistribution. In addition, the fact that the degree of commitment can
vary with the default costs introduces a rationale for why tax policy might not use
all available information, but rather just condition on coarse private information.
Related Literature
This paper contributes to a recently growing literature on the interaction and co-
existence of markets and governments. One branch of this literature attempts to iden-
tify circumstances under which markets outperform benevolent governments. Netzer
and Scheuer (2010) consider a setup in which time-inconsistency arises because of
an adverse selection problem. They show that markets can outperform benevolent
governments even when they face the same adverse selection problem, because they
provide greater incentives to exert effort. In their model, markets endogenously gen-
erate a form of commitment to refrain from full insurance and pooling. The key
characteristic of markets enabling them to implement separating equilibria is com-
petitiveness: agents are free to switch their insurance provider, just like firms can
renege on the insurance contracts. This two-sided lack of commitment is what dis-
tinguishes the markets they consider from a benevolent government.
Acemoglu, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2008a, 2008b) also compare the efficiency of mar-
kets and governments in a setting without commitment. They explore the impact
of political economy constraints on optimal redistributive policy. To that end, they
consider infinitely repeated games with equilibria that crucially rely on reputation
effects - a channel completely abstracted from in this paper.
In contrast to these contributions, I am not comparing the performance of mar-
kets and governments, but rather ask how the presence and functioning of markets
influences the government's ability to implement redistributive policy. Some charac-
teristics of markets have been considered in the literature: Scheuer (2010) explores
the impact of incomplete credit markets on optimal entrepreneurial taxation. He finds
that a market friction which gives rise to cross-subsidization between different types
of potential entrepreneurs may induce inefficient entry at both ends of the skill dis-
tribution, which in turn promotes an additional corrective role for type-differential,
redistributive taxation, even when the government originally has no redistributive
objective. Unlike in Scheuer's paper, I consider a market that is not incomplete in
that sense, and instead is able to provide credit without cross-subsidization.
Bisin and Rampini (2006) study a setup similar to the one considered here, but focus
on the allocative role of anonymous markets. They find that allowing agents access
to such markets is beneficial in a world where the government has no commitment,
because it allows them to allocate resources over time without revealing any informa-
tion, thereby increasing efficiency. However, the government's commitment problem
is unchanged, no social redistribution can be implemented. In contrast, I analyze a
market that does not act as a "tax haven" by enabling agents to hide information
from the government. The crucial characteristic of private contracts I consider is that
they constitute consumption commitments that cannot costlessly be changed. This
increases the government's commitment power, enabling it to implement some social
insurance.
The paper is organized as follows: I start by formulating a basic two period endow-
ment economy with private information about income types in section 1.2. In section
1.3, I derive the constrained efficient allocations for governments with and without
commitment when only the government has access to a borrowing technology as
benchmarks for the following analysis. Section 1.4 extends the setup by introducing
a financial market that allows agents to borrow against their future income. I derive
the constraints that agents' involvement in a financial market imposes on the plan-
ning problem. Here I discuss in detail the characteristics of the financial market that
lead to it functioning as a potential commitment device for the government. Section
1.5 analyzes the efficient allocations under this additional constraint for governments
that can or cannot commit to future policy ex-ante. The main point of the paper is
derived: due to default costs, a non-commitment government is able to implement an
allocation with partial separation, and thus can provide some social redistribution.
Finally, section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Endowment Economy with Private Informa-
tion
The model economy lasts for 2 periods (t=1,2) and is inhabited by a continuum of
agents of unit mass. Agents derive utility from a single consumption good according
to
2
U = u(ct).
t=1
Utility is time-separable, and the per period utility function u(- ) is strictly increas-
ing, concave, and lim u'(c) = oc. I also assume that u displays constant elasticity of
C-+0
intertemporal substitution. To simplify the following analysis, I assume that agents
do not discount between periods.
Agents receive heterogeneous income at the beginning of each period. Their in-
come types, denoted 0, are perfectly persistent over time and are private information.
Across the population 0 is continuously distributed over a support 8 = [6,0], F(0)
denotes its edf, which I assume to be continuously differentiable. Further, I assume
that 0 > 10.3 Apart from income heterogeneity, agents are identical.
Per period income is deterministic, and increases over time and across types. In
particular, I assume that it is tO. Consequently, agents would like to smooth con-
sumption over time and consume a constant fraction -3 of their overall income in2
each period.
3I make this assumption to rule out cases off the equilibrium path where agents and banks collude
against the government. The impact of this assumption is discussed in section 1.4.
Consider the problem of a benevolent social planner with a utilitarian objective and
equal Pareto weights on all agents. He chooses an allocation {ct(0)}t,e that assigns a
consumption level to each type 0 E 8, for each period t = 1, 2.
2
max U(ct(0)) dF(0)
{ct()}te e t_
s.t. ct(0) dF(0) < 3 OdF(0)
The aggregate feasibility constraint reflects the assumption that there exists a technol-
ogy to costlessly transfer resources between periods. The optimal allocation solving
this problem is described as follows:
Lemma 1 (First-Best Allocation)
At the first-best allocation there is full social redistribution and perfect smoothing of
consumption over time. All agents consume a constant fraction c1 (0) = c2 (0) = c -
' fe OdF(0) of the economy's total endowment in each period.
Proof: The first order condition with respect to any agent's consumption in either
period satisfies
a'(ct(0)) - A = 0 Vt, 0
where A is the Lagrange multiplier on the aggregate feasibility constraint. Thus,
ct(0) = ct(0') Vt.t',0,0'. E
1.3 Government with Information Constraints
Suppose a. benevolent government can borrow and save at the risk free gross interest
rate R = 1, i.e. it can costlessly transfer resources between periods. To implement
the desired allocation, it would like to institute a schedule of type specific transfers
{T 1 (0), T2(0)}. However, it faces private information constraints: When conditioning
the allocation on income types, the government must rely on information reported by
the agents. This turns the setup into a policy game between agents, choosing which
type to report, and the government, choosing the transfers to implement.
To analyze this game formally, consider first the timing of action:
1. Agents learn their income type 0.
2. The government announces a. schedule {T1 , T2 }.
3. Period 1:
a) Agents receive their first period endowment 0 and send a report o.
b) The government implements transfers {T1(o-)}.
4. Period 2:
a) Agents receive their second period endowment 20.
b) The government implements transfers {T 2(u)}, possibly different from the
schedule announced before, depending on its commitment power.
As usual in such setups with private information, it is crucial whether or not the
government can commit to not exploit the revealed information at a later point in
time, i.e. whether or not it can commit to not changing the announced allocation
to the disadvantage of some agents after information has been revealed. I assume
that the government can always commit to the announced schedule at least within
period 1, i.e. it will always implement transfers in period 1 according to the original
announcement. The potential commitment problem that is the subject of this paper
arises between periods 1 and 2. At that point the government has learned information
about the agents' types. If it is not committed to the announcement made earlier, it
may decide to implement transfers {T 2(a)} that differ from the initial announcement
{T 2(a)}. Whether or not a government can commit is public information, and agents
take it into account when choosing which type to report.
Let a : E " E denote an agent's reporting strategy, a function that maps from
the set of possible realizations of income types e to a. set of possible reports E. For
future reference, let o* denote the direct truth-telling strategy where agents simply
reveal their type truthfully, i.e. o-*(O) = 0. The utility obtained from any reporting
strategy o, given the government's transfers {T 1, T2 , T2} is
U(T(o)1) = u(0 + T1 (o)) + u(20 + T2(o-)) (1.2)
For truth-telling to be optimal for an agent of type 0, it must be that
U(T(o-*)|0) > U(T(o-)|0) Vo- (1.3)
The government's strategy involves choosing a set of transfer schedules
T = {T 1 , T2 , T2}m. When the government has commitment, {T 2} and {T 2} are ex-
ogenously constrained to be equal.
Definition 1
A (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium in the game between agents and the government is
given by strategies o-e and T' and a belief system B, such that o' and T' are best
responses to each other, given B. and beliefs are derived from Bayesian updating .
To analyze the equilibrium of this game, I employ a general mechanism design ap-
proach (as e.g. in Bester and Strausz (2001) and Skreta (2007, 2010)) where a fic-
titious mechanism designer is in charge of choosing strategy sets for the agents (the
set of possible reports E) and for the government (a set of possible transfer schedules
T). While abstract, this approach has a number of advantages: The fictitious plan-
ner is always able to commit. The Revelation Principle then allows attention to be
restricted to direct revealing mechanisms, i.e. agents' strategy set can without loss
of generality be restricted to the set of possible types e. The optimal mechanism
simply has to satisfy incentive compatibility for truth-telling (1.3). This is true even
when the government (a player in this game) has no commitment, because the ficti-
tious planner can restrict the government's strategy set as well: in particular, he can
decide how much of the information agents report is revealed to the government. For-
4 In the following analysis there will be no need to explicitly derive or condition on these beliefs.
mally, this amounts to the optimal mechanism specifying an information revelation
rule m : 8 " M that maps from agents' reports to some set of possible messages
the government observes. The government is then restricted to choose transfers T
that condition only on these messages. The function m could be such that no in-
formation is revealed (i.e. m is constant), full information is revealed (i.e. m is the
identity function), but could also allow for any form of partial information revelation
(i.e. m is constant over some subset of E so that some agents are pooled together).
Thus, this setup allows me to explicitly study situations where the government has
limited commitment in the sense that it can commit not to exploit a limited amount
of information. The main focus of the analysis in this paper will be on the optimal
form of the information revelation rule m as a proxy for the commitment power of
the government and the characteristics of the resulting allocation.
It is useful to think about the economic interpretation of the information revelation
rule: In reality, when taxes and transfers are conditional on private information, the
government must decide how people report this information. For example, the first
step to implementing an income tax is to design a tax return form that people use to
report their income. The government, knowing how much information it can commit
not to exploit in the future, can choose an institutional design that asks agents only
for coarse information. The tax return, for example, could only ask for an agent's
approximate income, or an income bracket. The function n can be interpreted as
this institution.
Moreover, note that since agents know whether or not the government has com-
mitment, they correctly anticipate the government's incentive to re-optimize pol-
icy in the second period, and so condition their reporting strategy on {T 2} rather
than on the announced {T2}. Thus, there is no need to specify both of them sepa-
rately. To summarize, the problem of the fictitious planner is to design a. mechanism
F = (m, {T1(m), T2 (m)}) that satisfies incentive compatibility for all agents:
U(T (m(0)), T2(m(0))I0) ;> U(T (m(0)), T2 (m(6))|0) VO, 6
It is without loss of generality to restrict attention to deterministic mechanisms 5 so
that the set of possible messages is Al = , and to assume that m. : 8 0 is weakly
increasing. Moreover, I normalize m such that
m(0) =0 for 0 = min{0 : m(6) = m} 6
In the remainder of this section I will derive the optimal mechanisms when the gov-
ernment can or cannot commit, and agents do not participate in a financial market.
These will serve as benchmarks. Section 1.4 then proceeds by deriving any additional
constraints on the mechanism design problem that arise when agents can borrow
individually in a financial market. Section 1.5 analyzes the resulting change in the
optimal use of information and the implemented allocation.
1.3.1 Government with commitment
When the government has commitment, the optimal mechanism solves the following
problem:
5 Due to the CRRA assumption, non-degenerate stochastic mechanisms are suboptimal. Since the ob-
jective function is concave, introducing risk could only improve matters if some incentive constraints
were relaxed. Making payoffs for lower type agents riskier does indeed relax higher types* incentive
constraints. However, since CRRA implies decreasing absolute risk aversion, the loss for the low
types from facing such risk is always higher than the gain in terms of relaxing incentive constraints
for higher types. See for example Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
6Tilhis just means that when some types are pooled together. the message sent to the government is
normalized to be equal to the lowest type in that group.
max u(tO + Tt(m(6)))dF(O) (1.4)
0t1
s.t. [T1(m(O)) + T2(m(O))]dF(O) < 0 (1.5)
2
OEargmaxyu(t+Tt(m(O))) VOEe (1.6)
t=1
m : 8 4 8 (1.7)
It maximizes a utilitarian welfare function (1.4) with equal Pareto weights on every
agent, subject to aggregate feasibility (1.5) and incentive compatibility (1.6), choosing
the information revelation rule m and the transfer schedule {T(0)} for t = 1, 2
optimally.
Lemma 2 (Information Revelation with Commitment)
If the government can fully commit, the optimal information revelation rule is such
that complete information about types is revealed: m(0) = 0 for all 0 E e.
Proof: Since the government has full commitment, Lemma 2 follows directly from the
Revelation Principle 7. E]
When the government is able to commit to not changing the announced transfer
schedule after information is revealed, it is optimal to implement a fully separating
allocation. The resulting constrained efficient allocation has the following character-
istics:
Lemma 3 (Optimal Allocation with Commitment)
At the optimal allocation with commitment:
(i) There is partial social redistribution - total consumption is increasing in type,
but less steeply than under autarky:
0< 8(c 1(0) + c 2 (0)) <30
'See for example Myverson (1979) and Harris and Townsend (1981).
(ii) The degree of smoothness of consumption increases with type, only the highest
type smooths consumption perfectly:
cI(O) = c2()
cI(6) < c 2(0) & c2 (O) > 0 VO < 680
Proof: See appendix 1.7.1.
The setup resembles the traditional static Mirrlees (1971) model, where the desire
to smooth consumption efficiently over time corresponds to the optimal labor/leisure
choice in Mirrlees' setup. The optimal allocation depicts the classic trade-off between
allocative efficiency and informational rent extraction under adverse selection. Even
though both forms of redistribution (across the population as well as across time) are
in the government's interest, the private information constraints introduce a trade-off
between the two. Since the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is constant, all
types are willing to give up the same fraction of their total income for smoothing
consumption over time. In absolute terms, agents with higher income types would
pay more for consumption smoothing than lower income types. The government uses
the degree of smoothness as an incentive for higher types to reveal themselves and
agree to higher contributions to social redistribution - the ability to do so crucially
depends on the government being able to commit to the allocation ex-ante. Perfect
consumption smoothing for the highest type is analog to M\irrlees' (1971) "efficiency
at the top" result, non-perfect smoothing for all other types refers to the distortion
of efficiency for all types other than the highest.
1.3.2 Government without commitment
If policy is chosen sequentially and the government cannot commit to a schedule ex-
ante, the before stated optimization problem becomes even more constrained. The
optimal allocation can be found by solving the above planning problem subject to an
additional commitment constraint.8 It must be clear that when types are revealed,
the government does not have an incentive to renege on the promised allocation at
a later point in time. The problem is the same as above (equations (1.4) through
(1.7)), with the following additional constraint:
{T 2(m(9))} E arg max u(20 + t 2(m(9)))dF(6)
{t2 (m(O)) J e (1.8)
s.t. J[T(m(0)) + t 2(m(9))]dF() < 0
This constraint requires that in period 2, the government won't change the promised
transfer schedule based on information it learned in period 1. Since types are persis-
tent, this amounts to maximizing second period welfare, only constrained by feasibil-
ity.
Lemma 4 (Information Revelation without Commitment)
If the government cannot commit, the optimal information revelation rule is such that
no information about types is revealed: m.(O) = 0 for all 0.
Proof: See appendix 1.7.2.
When the government cannot commit to not exploit information about types in pe-
riod 2, it is not optimal to implement any separation at all. All agents will pool with
the lowest type, no information about types is revealed.
The argument of the proof is as follows. Because of the commitment constraint (1.8),
the government loses the ability to offer any separation in period 2 consumption: Since
the necessity to provide incentives for agents to reveal their type truthfully vanishes
after the first period, the government would always change the announced allocation
when provided with the opportunity to do so. Such deviation from the ex-ante opti-
inal contract, though, is not beneficial for all agents. The government offering above
8While before agents were moving after the government, lack of commitment introduces a second stage
to the game, where only the government can move again. The commitment constraint essentially
imposes subgame-perfection on the equilibrium, as e.g. in Kydland and Prescott (1977).
mean type agents a worse allocation after learning their true income is known as the
ratchet effect 9 . Agents anticipate this, so incentives for truthful revelation need to be
provided through transfers in period 1. However, to achieve any separation in types,
the incentive payments would have to be so high, that redistribution would go from
the bottom to the top of the income distribution - inequality would rise compared
to autarky. Thus, complete pooling is the optimal choice of information revelation.
Consequently, no redistribution across agents (i.e. social insurance) and almost no
redistribution across time (i.e. consumption smoothing) will be implemented:
Lemma 5 (Optimal Allocation without Commitment)
At the optimal allocation without commitment:
(i) There is no social redistribution - agents consume their total endowment, total
consumption increases in type as under autarky:
c1(0) + c2(0)= 30 VO
(ii) Only one type 0* smooths consumption perfectly:
3
ci(0*) c2(0*) = 0*2
1 1
cl(6) 0 + -0* c2 (0) = 20 - -0* V0 p 0*2 2
Proof: When no information about types is revealed, the only instrument to increase
welfare is to hand out non-differential transfers. The government will choose these
optimally to smooth consumption for on particular type 0*. All other agents therefore
smooth only the part of income equal to that of type 0* and consume their remaining
income on the spot. O
In this economy, the government's lack of commitment has dramatic implications.
Not only is the government unable to implement any social redistribution, the re-
'The insight that the only incentive compatible sequence of spot contracts is one without dynamic
insurance is due to Townsend (1982).
sulting allocation is also very inefficient: Even though transferring resources across
time is costless, this technology remains almost unused, because it would require the
revelation of private information. Roberts' (1984) insight applies in this economy.
1.4 Individual Access to a Financial Market
Suppose now that agents have access to a financial market in which they can save
and borrow at interest rate R = 1, i.e. they can use the same technology to transfer
resources over time that is available to the government. Naturally, agents would use
this opportunity to smooth consumption over time. Neither allocation analyzed in
section 1.3 had full smoothing for all agents, so access to such a financial market likely
imposes a binding constraint on the optimal mechanism. The purpose of this section
is to derive the constraints that stem from the contracts agents may write in such a
financial market.
Bisin and Rampini (2006) first showed, that in a setup similar to the one presented
here, financial markets that can be used anonymously may be a beneficial constraint
for a government without commitment. Such markets improve efficiency in the al-
location of resources over time without disclosing information about types to the
government. This leads to an increase in welfare. The government's commitment
problem, however, remains unchanged. Still, no social redistribution would be possi-
ble.
I emphasize a different mechanism: Agents use the financial market to smooth con-
sumption over time. To do that, they pledge future income in private contracts that
resemble long-term consumption coummitmnents (e.g. mortgages). When a govern-
ment changes the announced allocation, these contracts may have to be renegotiated
or even be defaulted on - a process that is usually costly. This introduces a cost to
deviating from the announced allocation ex-post. In fact, it will turn out that agents'
involvement in a financial market may essentially provide the government with a form
of limited commitment. The presence of markets may thus facilitate rather than hin-
der redistribution across agents. To derive this insight formally, I will lay out the
critical characteristics of the market environment and derive the structure of private
contracts that emerge in the presented economy. These contracts will be treated as
constraints to the mechanism design problem. Section 1.5 proceeds with analyzing
their impact on the optimal revelation of information and the resulting allocation
when the government can or cannot commit through an exogenous commitment de-
vice.
Assumptions about the financial market
The market consists of many banks that have access to unlimited outside funding.
Agents and banks can write contracts
[(hI (), h2 (0)), (bi (a), b2 (U))] with ht, bt ; 0
where the bank agrees to provide ht units of consumption in period t for a payment
of bt by the agent who announced type a. This structure of contracts is very general.
In what follows I will discuss which of these four determinants of contracts are of
relevance to the results.
I make the following assumptions that shape the type of debt contracts signed by
agents in this economy.
(Al) Competition between banks ensures that they make zero profits. The gross
interest rate agents face is R = 1.
(A2) Banks can always enforce their contracts with the individual agents. This en-
forcement power is never revoked, or in other words, the government is always
able to commit not to shut down the market. However, banks have the first take
on net-of-tax income only. They do not possess any power over the government
to enforce bailouts.
(A3) The market is not completely anonymous as in Bisin and Rampini (2006). The
government can observe the contracts agents sign in the financial market up to
the precision with which it observes agents' type announcements. This means
that agents who are pooled together by the information revelation rule m are
still able to write differential contracts without revealing any additional infor-
mation to the government. However, the government observes if the contracts
are feasible given the announced type. Thus, the financial market does not
act as a "tax haven". Agents who reported a lower income than they actually
have are not able to secretly smooth their consumption. On the other hand, all
agents who reported their type truthfully are able to smooth consumption per-
fectly without revealing their precise type. This restriction on observability of
transactions in the financial market is introduced for expositional convenience,
and I will point out its impact on the results. The main results are unchanged
if contracts were completely observable.
(A4) The government is not able to restrict access to the financial market or punish
agents' market involvement except when it reveals that they were lying about
their type. This amounts to assuming that the government cannot announce
a transfer schedule T ex-ante that conditions payments on whether agents will
contract in the financial market. It does not exclude the possibility that a
government without commitment implements differential transfers ex-post de-
pending on the contracts that were signed.
Consider the following modified timing of events:
1. Agents learn their income type 0.
2. A mechanism F = (m, {T 1 (m), T 2 (m)}) is announced.
3. Period 1:
a) Agents receive their first period endowment 0 and send a, report o-(0).
b) The government observes messages m(o) and implements transfers {T1(m)}.
c) Agents may contract in the financial market, first period payments b1 and
hi are executed
4. Period 2:
a) Agents receive their second period endowment 20.
b) The government implements transfers {T 2(m)}, possibly different from the
schedule announced before, depending on its commitment power. It takes
the contracts agents signed into account.
c) Second period payments b2 and h 2 are executed
Assumption (A2) is reflected in the fact that transactions in the financial market
always take place after the government implemented its transfers. Together with as-
sumption (A4), this implies that the government cannot levy a tax on ht directly.10
It can only influence net income and thereby bound the possible debt payments bt.
A government that can choose policy sequentially will take the contracts agents signed
into account when re-optimizing the transfer schedule in period 2. This is the key
argument: The continuation value of agents' contracts may be such that the gov-
ernment finds it not optimal to renege on the promised allocation and so effectively
gains commitment. In case an agent of (announced) type o defaults on his loan, i.e.
in case he cannot pay the amount b2 (a) agreed upon, his contract is renegotiated
to [h2 (0), b2 (U)]. It is without loss of generality to assume that the bank cuts the
contracted payment h 2 to zero:
12(Or) = 0 (1.9)
Yet, the bank remains in power to collect any outstanding balance d1 (a) - hi (a) -
bi (a) from period 1. Such renegotiation, however, comes at a cost: The bank does
not value h 2 at the same rate the agent does. From the bank's point of view, saving
101n reality, Austria is one of few exceptions to this assumption. The Austrian government levies a
tax of currently 0.8% of the loaned amount in any debt contract on the debitor.
the second period payment is worth only h2 - HB. There are several interpretations
for this cost: First, re-allocating resources to a new project is costly for a bank.
Renegotiating contracts may also require costly administration. Second, notice that
h2 can be interpreted as collateral on the loan. It is only natural to assume that the
bank might not be able to resell the asset for the same value it had for the particular
agent. Banks, however, cannot make losses when agents default. I assume that they
remain in power to collect the difference HR from the defaulting agent's net-of-tax
income. Therefore, the defaulting agent cannot consume before repaying
b2 (o-) = min{d1(o) + H, 20 + T2 (m(o-))} (1.10)
If his net-of-tax income is less than di + HB, he would have to consume zero. More-
over, an agent who has to default on his loan may suffer an additional utility loss
HA that the government also has to take into account when reneging on its promised
transfer schedule.
The default costs HA + HB = H summarize the key characteristic of contracts in
private financial markets that I want to emphasize in this paper: Contracts are not
easily reversible, nor is it costless to renegotiate or default. The costs may be of
very diverse nature: On the one hand, one might think of pure resource costs for
administering the renegotiation. Re-allocating funds from one loan to another is also
costly. A bank might not be able to resell an asset for the same value agreed upon
previously with the now defaulting agent. Such costs are summarized by HR. On
the other hand, agents might suffer a loss in utility when they have to default on
their loan in addition to the resource costs of the bank. They may have made life
plans contingent on this loan that require further costly alteration. For example, they
might have grown attached to their house, which they financed with a mortgage, and
lose utility when they have to move. Such costs are summarized by HA.
In short. agents who have access to financial markets may tie up their resources in a
contract whose continuation value needs to be taken into account when redistribut-
ing across the population. Redistributing across agents more than initially announced
becomes costly ex-post, and so alters the government's optimization problem.
Structure of debt contracts
Banks set borrowing limits per announced type a that reflect total net-of-tax income.
Assumption (Al) implies that all contracts will be such that
hi(a) + h 2 ((-) = bi(a) + b2 (a) (1.11)
Conditioning the contracts on agents' reports o- rather than their types 0 eludes to
the fact that banks must rely on the information agents reveal about themselves. In
the first period all agents are net-borrowers. This opens up the possibility that an
agent reports a much higher type to take advantage of a high borrowing limit and
plans a sure default. To avoid such adverse selection, banks would like to verify that
agents are at least of the type they claimed. While banks cannot verify an agent's
type directly, notice that they can offer contracts that require a down payment of
bi (a) = a- + T1 (n(o)) (1.12)
This proof of solvency acts as a screening device, i.e. it signals to the bank that the
agent is indeed at least of the type he claimed lie was." Competition then ensures
that each agent can find a bank offering a contract with a borrowing limit that re-
flects the exact net income of the type be announced. Banks cannot gain by offering
contracts that don't require down payments, since only agents who mnisreported their
type would sort into those.
'This setup allows me to abstract from any additional adverse selection problem the financial market
may face. Scheuer (2010) considers the impact of a financial market with adverse selection on optimal
policy. Since I assumed 0 > 10, banks could never gain from letting agents borrow more than their
type renders feasible. Without that assurnption one could imagine a case where agents borrow much
more than they can repay, forcing the government to bail them out. With that assumption. any
agent would always be able to pay even the highest types tax in period 2, the default loss would
then have to be absorbed by the bank.
Notice that because of these down payments, default is only possible if the gov-
ernment deviates from the announced transfer schedule. For the remainder of the
analysis, it is enough to keep track of the net debt obligation each agent carries over
to period 2:
d i (er) = hi(or) - bi(o)
Agents in this economy use the market to borrow against their second period income,
to smooth consumption and consume more in period 1 than they are endowed with.
Contracts will thus typically have hi > 0. How much agents can borrow depends on
the type they reported. Banks will set borrowing limits that reflect total net income:
hi (o)'+ h2 (a) < 3(u) + T1 (m(o-)) + T2 (m(o-))
Even though the market and information structure impose some constraints, agents
can still choose between a variety of contracts. Given a schedule of transfers and
his report o, an agent chooses to contract in the financial market to maximize his
life-time utility:
2
max u(tO + Tt(m(o-)) + ht (or) - b(o-))
ht ,bt t=1
s.t. hi(c) + h 2(a)= b1(o-) + b2(u~)
b;(o-) E {0, o- + T1 (m (o-))}
2a + T2 (m(o-)) if bi(o-) > 0
= 0 if bi(o-) = 0
Whenever transfers are such that the agent's net income is not smooth over time, the
optimal solution to this problem is such that
b1 = o + T1(m(o))
1hi = (3o- + T1(m(a)) + T2 (m(u)))2
1
Sdi = hib i b o- - T1(m(r)) + T 2 (m(o-)) (1.13)2
Optimal contracts are not uniquely pinned down. In the second period, payments
could be as low as
b2 () = di(o,) and h 2 (U) = 0 (1.14)
(in this case, the agent would simply repay his outstanding debt), or as high as
1
b2(0')= 2or + T2(m(o-)) and h2 = hi = -(3a- + T1(m(o-)) + T2 (m(o))) (1.15)2
I refer to these possibilities as net or gross contracts respectively. All contracts iII
between these extremes leave the agent with the same consumption allocation. How-
ever, when signing a gross contract, agents enter a consumption commitment for
period 2 beyond the repayment of their net balance. While both types of contracts
serve to allocate resources over time and to smooth consumption, a gross contract
does that in the form of a long-term commitment. In other words, a gross contract
may be interpreted as a mortgage, where the agent constrains his consumption of
housing to a particular house not only in period 1, but also in period 2 with the
help of a financial contract. If the government has ex-ante commitment, agents are
indifferent between signing net and gross contracts. However, if the government has
no ex-ante commitment, it will turn out to be individually optimal for agents to sign
gross contracts.
The financial market provides agents with the opportunity to smooth their consump-
tion perfectly over time. Moreover, agents may sign contracts that resemble long-term
consumption commitments (e.g. mortgages). While this additional characteristic of
private contracts in a financial market is irrelevant for the government with commit-
ment, it will turn out to be crucial in determining the de facto commitment power of
a government that chooses policy sequentially.
1.5 Commitment Through the Financial Market
When agents have access to a financial market, the private contracts described by
equations (1.13) through (1.15) constrain the choice of the optimal mechanism F
(m, {T1(m), T2 (m)}).
1.5.1 Government with commitment
When the government can commit to a schedule {T1(m), T2 (m)} ex-ante, the optimal
mechanism now solves problem (1.4) subject to feasibility (1.5) and a set of modified
incentive compatibility constraints:
2
OEargmaxl u(t+Tt(m($))+ht(S)-bt($)) VO,5Ee (1.16)
t=1
taking the contracts agents sign as given. With access to the financial market, all
agents who revealed their true type are able to perfectly smooth consumption them-
selves.
Lemma 6 (Information Revelation with Commitment)
If the government can fully commit, the optimal information revelation rule is such
that complete information about types is revealed: mn(O) = 0 for all 0 E 0.
Proof: Since the government has full commitment, Lemma 6 follows directly from the
Revelation Principle. 1 2 [O
12 1f contracts were perfectly observable, i.e. the restriction in assumption (A3) would not apply, the
simple revelation principle would not apply. Then, agents who are pooled together by the function
in would also pool on the financial market so to not reveal any additional information. Thus, by
pooling agents together, the government could influence how agents can use the financial market,
and implement allocations with non-smooth consumption for pooled agents. However, even in that
case it turns out to be optimal for the government to choose full separation over any partial pooling
arrangement, so the result is unchanged.
The government still implements a fully separating allocation. However, the set
of modified incentive constraints (1.16) implies that it cannot achieve the allocation
outlined in Lemma 3. Due to the fact that it cannot use the smoothing of consumption
as an incentive anymore, less redistribution across the population is implemented at
the optimum.
Lemma 7 (Optimal Allocation with Commitment and Financial Market)
At the optimal allocation with commitment, when agents have access to a financial
market:
(i) There is partial social insurance, but less than without the financial market:
Total consumption is increasing in type, more than in Lemma 3, but less than
under autarkv:
< (c' (0) + c'(0)) 8(c1() + c2(0))0 < <0d < 3
where N denotes the allocation derived in Lemma 3 without the market.
(ii) All agents smooth consumption perfectly over time: c 1 (0) = c2 (0) VO.
Proof: Given how agents contract in the financial market, the government, essentially
faces the extra constraints
0 + T1(0) = 20 + T2 (0) V0
Except for the highest type 0, this constraint changes the allocation the government
would have liked to implement. Incentives for truthful revelation can now only be
given by higher total consumption, using the degree of smoothness as incentive is not
an option anymore. Redistributing across agents thus becomes more expensive, less
social insurance is possible. O
Notice that the equilibrium is not unique: Since the government can commit to
the allocation, all agents will be indifferent as to whether or not they borrow in the
financial market, as long as they receive smooth net-of-tax income. Because of the
ex-ante commitment, it is irrelevant for the government, whether agents have en-
tered long-term consumption commitments. It is only the allocative aspect of agents'
contracts that impacts the governments ability to redistribute across society. The
implemented consumption allocation, however, is the same in all equilibria. I mark
the resulting allocation with superscript c for future reference.
This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Government with Commitment and Financial Market)
A government that can commit to an allocation ex-ante does not benefit from agents
having access to a financial market.
Proof: Without individual access to financial markets, the government still had the
technology to provide perfectly smooth consumption for all agents. Yet, it optimally
chose not to do so. Thus, the extra constraint reduces overall welfare, the allocation is
inferior to the allocation of Lemma 3 from the government's point of view. Assump-
tion (A4) implies that the government cannot deter agents from using the market by
announcing punishments for doing to.L
The presence of markets reduces the set of policy instruments available to the govern-
ment. When agents can costlessly take care of individual consumption smoothing, the
resulting allocation does not allow the government to implement the desired trade-off
between redistribution over time and redistribution a-cross the population. Instead,
perfect smoothing over time, but less social insurance will be realized.
1.5.2 Government without commitment
For a government that cannot commit to a second period schedule {T 2(m)} ex-ante,
individual access to a financial market interferes with its optimization problem in the
same way as if it had commitment. But there is an additional effect: the lack of
commitment constraint (1.8) is modified as well. When deciding about redistributive
policy after information has been revealed, the government has to take into account
the continuation value of the debt contracts agents hold. Redistributing away from an
agent who pledged all his income results in a costly default. Thus, for a government
without commitment, the optimal mechanism solves the same problem as above, but
subject also to the modified commitment constraint
{T2 (m)} c argmax (1.17)
u(20 + T 2(m(0)) +h 2 (0) - b2 (0)) ff{20 + T 2(m(0)) > b2 (0)} +
u(20 + T2 (m(0)) - (d1 (0) + HB) - HA) ]{20 + T2(m(0)) < b2 (0)} dF(0)
s.t. T1(m(0)) + T2 (m())dF(0) < 0
taking the contracts agents can sign as given. Notice that both forms of default costs
enter in the same way into the consideration: They both determine the continuation
value of the contract the agent signed, and the government has to take potential losses
that may result from default into account.
Suppose all agents sign a gross debt contract, i.e. b2(0) = 20 + T2(m(0)) for all
types. In this case, any deviation from the previously announced allocation will lead
to default. Given the enforcement power of the financial market, agents who are
forced to default will have to be at least provided with a payment that covers d1 + H
to avoid zero consumption. The above problem de-facto reduces to redistributing
based on what agents planned to consume in the second period, h2 :
max / i(1 2(n(0)))dF(0){2(0)} Je (1.18)
s. t. J i 2(m(0))dF(0) < ][h 2 (0) - H{ ls2(m(0)) < h2(0)}]dF(0)
This formulation of the government's problem at the beginning of period 2 nicely
depicts the main point: the government is still free to redistribute, but doing so is
costly. The default cost H = HA + HB Conceptually enters only on the resource side
of the feasibility constraint.1 3
From here it is also immediate that a large enough H would prevent any deviation
from the promised schedule:
Proposition 2 (Limit Case: Full Commitment)
When all agents pledge their complete income in the financial market and if H >
{ (30 + T(O) + T{ (O)), the government can implement the same allocation as if it had
full commitment.
Proof: Suppose the government had promised the full commitment schedule {Tj(0)}e.
The highest type 6 will accordingly plan to consume hc(O) = (30 + Tc(O) + Tj(0))
in period 2. In case he has to default, the default cost is more than what he actually
planned to consume. The government would gain no resources for redistribution from
letting even the highest type default, and thus would never attempt any redistribution
ex-post. It can therefore implement the same allocation as if it had full commitment
ex-ante. O1
The result of Proposition 2 should be understood as a limit result: If default costs are
so high that they leave no value after renegotiation, it obviously serves as a, device for
full commitment. Such high default costs are unrealistic, they could be interpreted
as not offering default as an option. It is interesting, however, that a finite default
cost would be enough to induce full commitment. The more relevant case, though, is
one where default costs are too low to offer full commitment:
Proposition 3 (Information Revelation: Limited Commitment)
If the government has no ex-ante commitment, but all agents pledge their complete
income in the financial market and the default costs H are positive, the optimal
information revelation rule is such that it pools agents above a cutoff type 6 together
1 3 Farhi and Werning (2008) consider a government that faces an exogenous cost of reform. The
analysis in the present paper can be interpreted as providing one possible micro-foundation for such
a reform cost and showing how it leads to limited commitment.
but separates all other types:
m(O) = 0 VO<
m() = O VO >
The cutoff 6 and transfers T must be such that
U'(h2(0))(h 2(0) - h2(0) - H) = u(h2 (0)) - u(h2())(1.19)
where h2 (0) = j(0 + T1(m(0)) + T2 (m(0))).
Proof: See appendix 1.7.3.
The proposition states that a government without commitment gains the power to
commit to a partially separating allocation if agents hold gross financial contracts, as
long as they face positive default costs. How much separation is possible, or in other
words how many types at the top of the distribution will pool, depends on the default
cost H and on the concavity of the utility function. The intuition for the constraint
is simple: the marginal benefit from deviating from the promised allocation (on the
left, hand side) is measured by the marginal utility of the lowest type (since he is the
one distributed toward) times the amount of resources available for redistribution.
The marginal cost of such deviation (on the right hand side) is the utility loss of the
highest type: his consumption is equalized with that of the lowest type.
More separation of types, i.e. a higher 0, leads to a larger differentiation in period 2
consumption h2(O) - h2(O) (due to the incentive constraints in the ex-ante optimiza-
tion problem), and in turn to a tightening of the constraint. A higher default cost H
on the other hand relaxes the constraint, so that more separation is possible. In fact,
when H > h'(0), the government will be able to commit to the same allocation as
the full commitment government (Proposition 2). Proposition 3 states. however, that
any positive default cost, even a very small one, allows the government at least some
commitment. Notice also that the degree of possible separation is negatively linked
to the concavity of the utility function. If u(.) is more concave, the ex-post gain from
redistribution increases." In order to be able to withstand the higher temptation to
let a fraction of agents at the top default, more agents have to be pooled together,
the cutoff 6 has to be lower.
When H = 0, the case of no commitment is recovered: As long as the utility function
is strictly concave, condition (1.19) is only satisfied when h2 (0) = h2(6), i.e. when
there is no separation at all. As in in the benchmark case without a financial market,
when the government is not able to implement any separation in the second period,
it cannot provide enough incentives through first period transfers to implement any
social redistribution from the top to the bottom of the distribution.
The default costs essentially serve as a commitment device for the government. With
any positive default costs, the government can gain limited commitment: It can cred-
ibly commit to not exploit a limited amount of information. By pooling agents at
the top of the distribution together, only limited information is revealed: For agents
of type 0 < 0 the true type is revealed, while for all agents of type 0 > 0 the govern-
ment only learns that they are part of the high income group, but not their exact type.
The following lemma summarizes the characteristics of the best allocation the gov-
ernment is able to commit to:
Lemma 8 (Optimal Allocation without Commitment and Financial Market)
At the optimal allocation without commitment, when agents have access to a financial
market,' the default cost is 0 < H < hc(0) and the conditions in Proposition 3 are
met:
(i) There is partial social insurance - total consumption increases in type, but less
1 4 Because I study the problem of a government with a utilitarian objective with equal Pareto weights
on all agents, the concavity of the individual utility function also measures the potential welfare gain
from redistribution. More generally, the form of the government's objective function is the crucial
characteristic to determine the optimal cutoff 0.
steeply than under autarky:
0< D(c1(0) + c2 (0))
0
(ii) All agents smooth consumption perfectly over time: cI(O) = c2 (0) VO.
Proof: All agents who report their type truthfully are able to use the financial mar-
ket for perfect consumption smoothing. This provides incentives for agents to reveal
themselves. As in the Lemma 3, the government uses the information gained about
types to implement some social insurance. l
The government, even though per se not able to commit to an allocation ex-ante,
is able to implement some redistribution across agents, i.e. it can provide some level
of social insurance. This leads directly to the following proposition:
Proposition 4 (Government without Commitment and Financial Market)
If default costs H are positive, a government that cannot commit to an allocation
ex-ante always benefits from agents having access to financial markets.
Proof: Proposition 3 establishes that with positive default costs H the government
is able to commit to a partially separating allocation that provides some social in-
surance - an improvement over the pooling allocation in Lemma 5 without financial
markets. However, contrary to the case in which the government has commitment
ex-ante, here the commitment power hinges critically on agents actually borrowing
in the financial market. It remains to be shown that agents will indeed sign gross
contracts in the financial market. Since agents are small, non-strategic players in
this policy game, it would be a stretch to assume that they coordinate on signing
such contracts in order to provide a commitment device for the government. Notice,
however, that once a schedule is announced and types have been reported, i.e. at the
stage of choosing a debt contract, it is individually optimal to sign a gross contract
and enter a, consumption commitment for period 2:
At the beginning of period 2, the last stage of the game, the government without an
exogenous commitment device chooses the transfer schedule to solve problem (1.17),
knowing what contract each agent has signed. The government would like to equalize
consumption as much as possible. If an agents has signed a contract such that
b2 (0) < m() + T2 (m(6))
it is costless and thus optimal for the government to redistribute the unpledged por-
tion of promised after-tax income away from that agent, and redistribute it toward
lower types. This leaves the agents worse off than if he had signed a gross contract.
However, regardless of whether or not all other agents signed gross contracts, the gov-
ernment will not find it optimal to let those who did default. Thus, it is a dominant
strategy for agents to sign such gross contracts. O
The role of the financial market is to give agents the opportunity to pledge their
expected resources in debt contracts which in turn influences the government's abil-
ity to commit at least to a partially separating allocation. Therefore, it also facilitates
redistribution across the population. This mechanism is the central insight of this pa-
per. The crucial characteristic of contracts in the financial market is not that agents
are free to allocate resources. It is that in order to allocate resources, agents are able
to enter consumption commitments that cannot costlessly be changed.
Additional Assumption: Horizontal Equity
The key insight of this paper is that the prospect of agents defaulting on their loans
enables the government to commit to some separation even after it learned agents'
private information. In the previous section I derived the specific form of separation
at the optimal allocation: Agents below a certain cutoff are perfectly separated, while
agents above that cutoff pool. Thus, in this specific setup, the commitment comes
from the fact that agents at the top of the income distribution would default on their
loans, if the government decided to redistribute across the population more than it
announced ex-ante.
In this section, I derive the form of partial pooling at the optimal allocation un-
der the additional assumption of horizontal equity. It means that the government
is bound to treat equal agents equally, i.e. it cannot randomize transfers between
seemingly equal agents. While there is nothing in the model that necessitates this
assumption, it has some realistic appeal.
Proposition 5 (Information Revelation under Horizontal Equity)
If the government has no ex-ante commitment, all agents pledge their complete income
in the financial market and the default cost is 0 < H < hc(6), the optimal information
revelation rule is such that it pools agents into finitely many groups throughout the
type distribution. Any H > 0 allows separation into at least two groups.
Proof: See appendix 1.7.4.
If the government is bound to horizontal equity, it is not optimal anymore to pool
agents just at the top of the distribution. In fact, since the government cannot let just
a fraction of any pooled group of agents default, less pooling at the top is necessary,
more information about the highest types can be revealed and used to provide social
insurance.
At the optimum, agents will be pooled throughout the distribution in groups of
varying size - a structure that can be interpreted as tax brackets. The effective con-
mitment power of the government then stems from the concern of agents defaulting
on their loan throughout the distribution, not just at the top.
1.6 Discussion
This paper uncovers a mechanism by which the presence of a financial market may
effectively provide the government with a (limited) commitment device, thereby en-
abling the implementation of commitment-type policies. It thus helps reconcile the
observation of policies that are suggestive of governments being able to commit, even
though there is no apparent commitment device. Moreover, the model provides a
rational for why governments do not implement policies contingent on complete in-
formation: When they have no ex-ante commitment power, a reasonable default cost
provides them with limited commitment, i.e. with the power to commit to not exploit
a limited amount of information.
In the presence of private information, the ability of a government to implement
social redistribution crucially depends on its power to commit to future policy. In
reality, there is little reason to believe that governments possess some exogenous
commitment device. Instead, commitment must stem from the environment the gov-
ernment operates in. The literature has focused on political economy constraints as
mechanisms for commitment. In contrast to that, the presented paper highlights the
fact that also the economic environment might enhance the commitment power of the
government. In that sense, the paper establishes a theoretical foundation for what
can be referred to as a social market economy, where the presence of well functioning
competitive markets that allow agents to enter consumption commitments plays a
crucial role for social redistribution.
People typically do not just rely on the government and simply consume their net-of-
tax income every period. Instead, they use private financial markets to allocate their
resources over time. Redistributive policy ought to take that into account. To address
the question how the presence of a financial market shapes the government's ability to
implement redistributive policy, I studied a standard M\Iirrlees framework. In the pre-
sented economy agents receive heterogeneous income, and a, benevolent government
might attempt two forms of redistribution: Smoothing of individual consumption over
time and social redistribution. Private information about income types, however, in-
troduces a trade-off between the two.
If the government can commit to future policy ex-ante, it is able to implement a
fully separating allocation. In this case, agents having access to a financial market re-
duces the set of policy instruments available to the government: It loses the ability to
provide incentives for truthful revelation through the degree of consumption smooth-
ness. Agents can use the financial market to smooth consumption by themselves. The
government is deprived of the power to discriminate along this dimension, extracting
private information from the agents gets harder. Consequently, a government with
full commitment cannot gain from agents' involvement in financial markets. It finds
itself unable to implement the constrained optimal trade-off between allocative effi-
ciency and equity. In such a setup, financial markets hinder redistribution across the
population.
However, if the government cannot commit to an allocation ex-ante and is thus unable
to implement social redistribution, it might gain from agents' involvement in financial
markets. In fact, it might gain the power to commit at least to a partially separating
allocation, making some social redistribution possible. The reason is that in order to
smooth their income over time, agents pledge future income in the financial market in
contracts that induce long-term consumption commitments. Such private contracts
are typically not easily reversible. A surprise redistribution, after agents have revealed
their type and signed individual debt contracts, will lead to some agents having to
default on their debt. Such default, however, is costly. These default costs mitigate
the government's desire to exploit information and implement full social insurance
ex-post.
The costs may be of very diverse nature: On the one hand, one might think of pure
resource costs for administering the default on a loan. For banks, re-allocating funds
from one loan to another is also costly. A bank might not be able to resell an asset for
the same value agreed upon previously with the now defaulting agent. On the other
hand, agents might suffer a loss in utility when they have to default on their loan in
addition to the resource costs of the bank. They may have made life plans contingent
on this loan that require further costly alteration. They might, for example, have
grown attached to their house, which they financed with a mortgage, and lose utility
when they have to move. I argued that any such costs alter the government's ex-post
optimization problem, since it has to take the continuation value of agents' contracts
into account. Agents' involvement in a financial market thus effectively provides a
commitment device for the government: Even though it has the ability to re-optimize
its policy over time, it does not find it useful to do so at any point.
How much commitment is possible depends on the size of the default costs. I de-
rived a simple condition that links the size of the default costs and the concavity
of the utility function to the degree of separation a government is able to commit
to. I show that whenever the default costs are positive, some separation can persist
after information is revealed: The government will optimally pool agents at the top
of the type distribution together and separate all other types perfectly. This allows
for some social insurance to be implemented and is thus a strict improvement on the
no-commitment equilibrium with complete pooling and no social insurance.
The intuition for the constraint is simple: it equates the marginal benefit from devi-
ating from the promised allocation (as measured by the marginal utility of the lowest
type who would be distributed toward tines the amount of resources available for re-
distribution) with the marginal cost of such deviation (the utility loss of the highest
type who would have to default). For a given functional form of utility, the higher the
default costs, the more separation can be implemented. Conversely, for given default
costs, the more concave the utility function is, the higher would be the ex-post welfare
gain from redistribution. The government would be more tempted to deviate from
announced policy ex-post, and so is able to commit only to less separation ex-ante.
The particular form of optimal information revelation changes when the government
is restricted to horizontal equity, i.e. if it cannot randomize transfers between seem-
ingly equal agents. This constraint exogenously mitigates the commitment problem,
and while the allocation with pooling above a threshold is still feasible, it is not op-
timal anymore. Instead, it turns out optimal for the government to pool agents into
finitely many groups throughout the type distribution. The resulting transfer sched-
ule then has a "tax bracket" structure. The government collects coarse information
about agents' types over the complete distribution. The higher the default costs are,
the more and the smaller these brackets can be, so that finer information can be
collected.
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1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 Proof of Lemma 3
First, notice that the first-best allocation is not incentive compatible: From an agent's
point of view, his consumption allocation x1 = X2 = x is fixed, no matter what type
lie reports. He then chooses to report type 0 to solve
max u(x + (0 - 0)) + u(x + 2(0 - 0))
Since utility is time-separable and per period utility is strictly increasing, first and
second period consumption are not perfect complements. Thus, every type has an
incentive to hide income from the government, thereby receiving the same allocation
of consumption as under truth-telling x plus the extra hidden income t(0 - 6). Each
agent then optimally chooses tho report the lowest possible type 0. Full social insur-
ance and perfect smoothing cannot be implemented.
Consider next the allocation with perfect smoothing over time for all types and no
redistribution across agents, i.e. xi(0) x2 (0) = '0. This allocation is incentive
compatible: The agent solves
max u(0 + -0) + u(20 - -0)
o 2 2
Optimality requires
81 (1 (
-- + -0) - u'(20 -- 0)) 0 (1.20)
6 2 2 2
1 1
u'(0 + -) =t'(20 -- 0) (1.21)
2 2
-+0 6=0 (1.22)
The last step follows because u(.) is strictly concave. At this allocation, per period
consumption xt(O) = tO + T(0) increases with slope 3. The concavity of the utility
function implies that it is strictly optimal for all agents report the true type. This
means that the incentive constraints are not binding for any type. Thus, there is
room for welfare increasing redistribution across agents. It follows directly that total
consumption will be increasing less than under autarky, i.e.
O(z1 (0) + X2 (0))<3
Next, I will derive the properties of the optimal allocation that result from such
redistribution. Redistributing across agents from top to bottom requires that the
sum of transfers T1 (0) + T2(0) should be decreasing in type, i.e.
8(T1_)_+_2_6 
_ Tj(O)(T1 (0) ± T 2 (0)) - T'(0) + T'() < 0 ++ - > 1 (1.23)DO T(0)
for all types 0 < 0. Just at the highest type, the contribution to the social redistri-
bution system need not be increasing, i.e. T1 (6) = -T2(6).
When agents choose which type to report, they solve
max u(O + T1 (0)) + u(20 + T2 (0))
6
A necessary condition for incentive compatibility thus is that the first order condition
of this problem be zero at 0 0:
U'(0 + T1 ()) 
_ -T2 (.24
u'(20 + T2 (0)) Tj(O)
First, notice that (1.23) together with (1.24) and concavity of u(.) implies that
xI(O) < x 2 (0) for all types 0 < 0, but xi(0) = x2(0). That is, perfect smoothing
for the highest type is optimal and smoothing is distorted for all other types.
For (1.24) to also be sufficient for incentive compatibility, it must be the case that
the second order condition for optimality is also satisfied at 0 0
u"(0±T1(0))(T)2 +u'(O+T1(0))T'+u"(2O+T2(0))(T') 2 +u'(20+T 2())T' < 0 (1.25)
Further differentiating (1.24) yields
u"(0±T1(6))T( x'1u'(0+T1 (0))Tf +u"(20+T 2 (0))T'x' +u'(20+T 2(6))T' = 0 (1.26)
where xt(0) = t0 + T6 (0) and so x'(0) = t + TI'(0).
Combining (1.25) and (1.26) gives the following monotonicity requirement
u"(0 + T 1 (0))Tfx' + u"(20 + T2 (0))T'x' > u"(0 + T1 (0))(TI) 2 + u"(20 + T2 (6))(T')2
(1.27)
which simplifies to
u"(0 + T1 (0))TI + 2u"(20 + T2(0))T' > 0
A sufficient condition for this to hold is that
2 > (
which due to CRRA implies
x1 > -X 22
Autarky implies x 1  x 2 , so that this condition is met when smoothness of consump-
tion is increased for all agents. Thus, the full set of IC constraints can be replaced
by the local incentive constraints (1.24) and the requirement that x1 > jx2 -
(1.28)
(1.29)
(1.30)
The government's problem then is to solve
max
{T 1,T2 }
s.t.
u(O + T1 (O)) + u(20 + T2 (0))
T1(O) + T2(0) < 0
U'(0 + T1 (0))T,(0) + 7t'(20 + T2 (O))T'(O) = 0
The first order conditions to this problem yield the following optimality condition:
u'(O + T1 (O)) - u'(20 + T2(0)) = 7(0)(u"( + T1 (0))T1(0) + u"(20 + T2 (O))T'(O))
where -y(O) are the Lagrange multipliers on the incentive compatibility constraints.
From this condition it follows that when xI(0) < x 2 (0)
u"(0 + T1 (0))T'(O) + u"(20 + T2 (0))T'(O) < 0 (1.31)
CRRA implies that
x2 _u"(xI) U'(x 2)
x1 71"(X 2) u'(XI) (1.32)
so that
xj(O) < X2(0) S2(0) >L'(X2(0))
x1 (0) 11'(xr1(6) )
(1.33)
Moreover, note that
X2(0)
x1(6)
20+T 2(0) x'2(60)
0 + T1 (0) x1(0)
2+T2(0)
1 + Tj(0) (1.34)
We would like to show that the degree of smoothness as measured by the ratio ! is
increasing in type, i.e
X'(O)X2(0) - x1(O)x2(0)
(x2(O ) )2
> 0 ++ (0)g (O
gri(o)
X2(0)
0o 2' ()(0) (1.35)
Combining optimality (1.31), CRRA (1.33), and (1.34) with (1.24) and (1.28) implies
that (1.35) holds, and thus the degree of consumption smoothness increases with type.
This concludes the proof.
1.7.2 Proof of Lemma 4
First, suppose the information revelation rule was such that all information reported
by the agents would be revealed to the government, i.e. m(0) = 0 for all types 0.
Constraint (1.8) implies that if the government possesses any information about types
at the beginning of the second period, it will exploit it so to equalize consumption as
much as possible. To see that, consider the first order conditions of the government's
problem (1.8) at t=2:
u'(20 + T 2()) - A = 0 VO
These conditions imply that the government will choose {T 2 } so to equalize con-
sumption across all agents, X 2 (0) = x 2 VO. From the agent's point of view then the
consumption allocation in period 2 is fixed, and he solves:
max u (x1 (0) + 0 - 0) + U(X2 + 2(0 - 0))
For truth-telling to be optimal, it is necessary that the first and second order condi-
tions are satisfied at 0 0, i.e. VO:
(x'(0) - 1)u'(x1(O)) - 2u'(x2) = 0 (1.36)
(x'() - 1)2'n"(x1(O)) + X'j'()u'(x1(0)) + 4u"(x 2 ) < 0 (1.37)
Further differentiating (1.36) yields
x'(0)(x'(0) - 1)V"(xi (0)) + x''()u'(x1 (0)) = 0
which reduces (1.37) to
- (x'(O) - 1)u"(x 1 (O)) + 4"(x 2 ) <0 (1.38)
This, together with (1.36) implies that for the allocation to be incentive compatible,
it must be such that VO
<-2
++ - x1()x2 < -2 U/(X2)x()
'( ()) U'(x 2 )
1 1
++ X 2 - < 2x 1 (O)-E E
where e is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, which is constant by assump-
tion. Thus, it must be true for all types that
1
X10) > 1 x2 (1.39)
Moreover, (1.36) can be rearranged as
,(0) u'(x 2 ) + 1x I't(x1(0))
This differential equation determines the shape of the consumption schedule in period
1. Two properties are important: x1 (0) is increasing in type, with a slope strictly
larger than 1. and with increasing slope. The lowest type, 0 will receive the lowest
period 1 consumption. To relax incentive constraints for the higher types, it is optimal
to start from the lowest possible x1 (O). A lower bound is x1(0) = 'x 2 . What is x 2?
X2= 2 J dF(0) - x1()dF(0) (1.40)
0 0
The second summand cannot be solved without further assumptions on the utility
function. But we can use a conservative lower bound to see what the government
would at most be able to achieve with a fully separating allocation. To that end,
suppose we ignore that £1(0) has to be increasing with increasing slope, and rather
assume that it will increase with constant slope x'(0) ~ 2. This is not a bad approx-
imation, since constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution implies u"'(.) < 0 and
so ( > is not a terrible assumption. This lower bound allows to compute an
upper bound on x 2 :
X2 <2 dF(0) - x 2 +2(0- O)dF(0) (1.41)
f 120 0
4
+X2 < -0 (1.42)3-
This leaves the lowest type at best with the consumption allocation [20, 40]. Notice
that this means he is distributed away from in the aggregate and also doesn't gain any
smoothness. This cannot be optimal from a social welfare point of view. It means
that the only separating allocation that can be implemented is one that increases
inequality and lowers welfare compared to autarky, and thus it is not optimal.
Notice that the argument does not change when the government learns only par-
tial information about types. Since the second period allocation is fixed, providing
incentives for any separation through first period transfers is so costly that it is not
optimal to do so. Thus, the optimal information revelation rule is one where no
information is revealed, i.e.
m (0) = VO
This concludes the proof.
1.7.3 Proof of Proposition 3
The proposition states that a government without commitment is able to iiplement
an allocation with at least partial separation, if all agents pledge their complete in-
come in the financial market. Strictly positive default costs alter the ex-post problem
of the government: it might even after the revelation of information not have an in-
centive to redistribute fully, because this would lead to costly default by agents who
are redistributed away from.
The proof proceeds as follows: In a first step I will establish the optimal form of
the information revelation rule. It turns out. to be optimal that agents with income
types above a threshold 0 are pooled together, while all agents below the cutoff are
completely separated. The second step derives the optimal cutoff type, dependent on
the the size of the default costs H and the concavity of the utility function.
First notice that the following Lemma holds:
Lemma 9
If the government wants to default, it will always default on the highest (observed)
type first. Even if the density of highest types is large (e.g. due to pooling at the
top), it prefers to randomize and default on some of the highest types rather than on
lower types.
Proof: Since ex-ante incentive compatibility implies that the promised allocation in
I = 2 is increasing in type, the gains from redistributing ex-post are highest when let-
ting the highest types default. The default costs H, on the other hand, are constant
per default. O
Suppose agents above some cutoff 6 are pooled together. Even if it is not optimal to
default on all of them, it might still be profitable for the government to default only
on a fraction 7r of them. The reason is that neither the gained resources nor the gain
in welfare from redistributing these resources are are linear in -F. The resources saved
are optimally distributed toward the lowest types. Thus, the gain is the highest for
the first redistributed dollars and decreases thereafter.
Let 0 denote the type below which agents get extra resources when the government
lets a fraction r of agents above the cutoff 0 default. The following graph clarifies
u(h2(E))
u(h2(6))
u(h2(6)) t
u(h2(E))
F(P) F($)
=0
F(5) Tr(1-F(5)) F(O) F(8)
=1
The resources gained for redistribution are
r(1 F(O))(h 2(O) - H - X2(0)) (1.43)
This is because the types who are forced to default will receive the same allocation
X2 (0) as the agents at the bottom of the distribution who are distributed toward. 0 is
a function of the resources gained, and so a function of ir so that the gain is generally
not linear in r.
The redistribution causes a loss of utility for the defaulting agents at the top, which
for the same argument is nonlinear in Tr:
-r(1 - F(O))(u(h2 (6)) - U(X2(O))) (1.44)
The gain in welfare comes from the utility gain for the types at the low end of the
distribution, below 0:
F(0)u(x 2(0)) - (1.45)j h2(0)dF(0)
0
notation:
The new consumption level x2(0) is derived by distributing resources equally between
the defaulting high type group and the low type group:
6
f h 2(0)dF(O) -r(1 - F(O))(h 2(O) - H)
X 2 (O)~ =F(5) + 7r(1 - F(O)) (1.46)
The net gain from letting a fraction -F of agents in the pooled group at the top of the
distribution default thus is nonlinear in -r. This makes it possible that the govern-
ment might optimally choose to randomize between seemingly equal agents instead
of defaulting on all of them.
Since all agents can smooth their consumption perfectly regardless of whether they
are pooled together with other types, the government will choose as much separation
as possible to gain as much information as it can commit not to exploit. Thus, it will
choose to separate all agents below the cutoff. This establishes the optimal form of
the information revelation rule:
m(O)=0 VO<
m() = 0 VO >
All agents below the cutoff are asked for precise information, all types above the cutoff
can truthfully only report the same income.
The second step of the proof involves finding the optimal pooling cutoff 0 so that
the government will not find it optimal ex-post to let even a few of the pooled agents
default, and so consequently does not find it optimal to let anyone default.
Given a promised allocation with pooling at the top, the government will choose
the optimal fraction 7r of default on the pooled group of agents according to
max[F(5) + ir(1 - F(5))]u(h2 (J)) - u(h 2(6))dF(6) - 7r(1 - F(5))u(h2(5))
00
f (h 2(0))dF() + r(1 F(6))(h 2(6) - H)
s.t. h2F(5))) (1.47)
0 T <1 (1.48)
The problem states that the government maximizes the welfare gain from defaulting
on a fraction r of the pooled agents subject to how many agents can be provided
with higher consumption depending on the resources saved due to not paying out
the promised high income to the high types. As introduced earlier, I denote with 0
the cutoff below which agents are better off after the redistribution. The government
wants to distribute the saved resources to the low types such that it makes optimal
use of the highest marginal utilities of more consumption. As a result, all agents
up to type 0 will get the same consumption as the type 0 was promised ex-ante, i.e
X2(0) = h2 (0). Of course the government will choose to provide the same level of
consumption to the agents who were just forced to default. The cutoff 0 is obviously
endogenous to the choice of 7r - the constraint (1.47) defines the optimal cutoff im-
plicitly.
The first order condition to this optimization problem, disregarding constraint (1.48)
for the moment, is:
Dh2(0)[F(5) + Tr(1 - F(0))]u'(h2 (0)) ( - (1 - F(0))[u(h2 (0)) - u(h 2(0))] = 0 (1.49)Oir
where
Dh2 (6) _ (1 - F(6))
(([2(0)- H)[F() + 7(1 - F(O))]
87 [(6 + gr1-F6)2
s (1.50)
- { h2(9)dF() + r(1 - F(5))(h2(5 - H))])
9
Note that since 0 is always chosen optimally depending on -r, by the Envelope Theo-
rem the derivative of 0 with respect to 7r need not be taken into account. First note
that since
h2(0)dF(0) = F($)h2($) - _r(1 - F(6))(h2 (0) - h2(O) - H)
9
we can rewrite
01 2(O) (1 - F(6))(h2(O) - h2 (O) - H) > 0 (1.51)
Dir F(O) + r(1 - F(5))
and so the first derivative simplifies to:
= (1 - F(5)) (h2(O) - h2 () - H) - (u(0) - u(h2 (0)))J (1.52)
The second order condition to this problem is always negative:
- (1 - F(5))u"(h2(0))(h2 (0) - h 2 (0) - H) < 0
Thus, there is only one optimal default probability 7*. Next, I will derive a condition
under which the government will find it optimal to choose r* = 0. For r* = 0 to
be optimal, we need the first derivative (1.52) to be less or equal to zero at -r = 0.
Less than zero makes ir = 0 optimal because of the non-negativity constraint (1.48)
disregarded before. Setting 7r = 0 leads to 0 0. Then evaluating (1.52) at 7r = 0,
gives the following final condition:
U'(h2(6))(h2() - h2(O) - H) < u(h 2 (5)) - u(h2 (q)) (1.53)
Given H and the functional form of u(.), the government can commit to a schedule
{h2(O)}e that pools agents above 0 and satisfies constraint (1.53). In fact, should
this condition not bind, less agents can be pooled together, which is preferable for
the government. Thus it will always choose 0 such that the condition holds with
equality.
It remains to be shown that for any positive H some separation is possible, i.e.
there exists a 6 > 0 such that condition (1.53) is satisfied. Notice that when there is
no separation (0 ) and H > 0, the condition is always slack:
u'(h2 (6))(-H) < 0 (1.54)
Thus, there is room for separation until the constraint binds, as long as H > 0. This
concludes the proof of Proposition 3.
1.7.4 Proof of Proposition 5
This proof proceeds by analyzing how the additional constraint of horizontal equity
changes the optimization problem in Proof 1.7.3.
First, notice that Lenna 9 (in Proof 1.7.3) does not hold anymore. Since the gov-
ernment cannot randomize transfers, once cannot conclude that in case any default is
profitable ex-post, it is optimal to let the highest types default. If enough agents at
the top are pooled together, it might be that defaulting on all of them is suboptimal,
while defaulting on some of them might have given a welfare improvement, but is not
allowed anymore. In that case, the government might decide to default on lower type
agents, simply because they are not so many. In what follows, I will show when that
can happen, and how the optimal pooling is chosen so to prevent the desirability of
any default ex-post.
Starting from an allocation where all agents are perfectly separated, it is still optimal
to default on the highest types first (unless H is high enough to give full commitment).
Thus, to be able to commit, some agents at the top need to be pooled. The cutoff 0
has to be such that
[F(O) + (1 - F(9))]u(h2(5)) < u(h2 (9))dF(9) + (1 - F(O))u(h2(0)) (1.55)
0
f(h 2 (0))dF(0) + (1 - F(0))(h 2 (0) - H)
where h2 (O) = (1.56)
(F(O) + (1 - F(O)))
This ensures that the gain from defaulting on all agents above 0 (left side of equation
(1.55)) is smaller than the associated loss (right side of equation (1.55)). Notice that
if the cutoff 0 is chosen such that the government is exactly indifferent (i.e. equa-
tion (1.55) holds with equality), then 0 is larger than the cutoff 6 derived by solving
the problem without the additional constraint of horizontal equity (problem (1.47)
in proof 1.7.3). The reason is simply that without the horizontal equity requirement,
the government had to be deterred from defaulting with any positive probability - a
stronger requirement than indifference for default probability 7 = 1.
Next, suppose 0 is chosen as high as possible, such that (1.55) binds, and all types
below this cutoff are perfectly separated. Then, the government will always find it
optimal to let a few agents just below the cutoff default. In other words, one can
always find a positive e, so that
0
[F(S) + ( F(O) - F($ )]uh() > u(h?2(0))dF(0) + U (h12(0))dIF(0) (1.57)
0
f(h 2 (0))dF(o) + f (h 2 (0) - H) dF(0)
where h2(0) = (1.58)
(F(O) + (F(O) - F(0 -
To prevent default on types below the cutoff 0, the government can either choose
0 =0 (then since default is not even optimal with probability zero, so it cannot
be optimal for any lower type, since less resources would be gained) or it can pool
agents below 0 so that it won't find it optimal to default on them. In other words,
the government is still able to implement the same allocation with pooling at the top
only as before. However, it may find it optimal to let fewer agents pool at the top,
but implement pooling throughout the distribution. In fact, it is easy to verify that
whenever agents in some range are perfectly separated, it is optimal to pool them
together and in return achieve more separation higher up the type distribution. The
reason is simply that more precise information about agents with higher income types
is more valuable, since more redistribution across agents can be achieved.
Thus, at the optimal allocation, agents will be pooled into finitely many groups
throughout the type distribution. As the default costs increase, the number of groups
increases. Only when default costs are high enough to give full commitment, perfect
separation (i.e. "pooling" into infinitely many groups) can be sustained. Since any
positive default cost allowed some separation in the case without horizontal equity,
any positive default costs always allows separation into at least 2 groups of agents
with the horizontal equity requirement. This concludes the proof of Proposition 5.
Chapter 2
Optimal Debt Bias in
Corporate Income Taxation
I present a rationale for a government to discriminate between debt and eq-
uity financing when taxing corporate income. For risk-averse entrepreneurs,
equity generates more surplus than debt, because it provides financing and
insurance. A government seeking to extract surplus from entrepreneurs
would naturally tax equity-generated income more than debt-generated
income. I also establish a less obvious reason for why the government
might want to extract surplus from entrepreneurs: It is well understood
that when the quality of projects is unobservable to investors, risk-averse
entrepreneurs with higher return projects retain a larger share of equity to
signal their type (Leland and Pyle (1977)). I show that in such an adverse
selection setting, while competitive investors are constrained to offer actu-
arially fair terms, the government can use taxes to discriminate between
types. This degree of freedom allows a manipulation of the relevant incen-
tive constraints so that a lower level of debt suffices for separation, and an
increase in overall efficiency can be obtained. Since entrepreneurs sepa-
rate along their debt-to-equity ratios, the optimal non-linear tax schedule
to achieve the desired discrimination is isomorphic to one that taxes debt-
generated income at a lower rate than equity-generated income.
2.1 Introduction
Many tax codes do not treat debt and equity financing equally. While interest pay-
ments for a, loan can often be deducted fron the corporate income tax base, dividends
to equity holders are taxed as profits on the firm side (and then often again as capital
income on the investor's side). This constitutes a discrimination in favor of debt
financing which is widely believed to be suboptimal. In this paper, I present a rea-
son for why a government might optimally choose to discriminate between debt and
equity financing. When provided by a competitive financial market, debt and equity
financing generate different levels of surplus for the entrepreneur: While both help the
entrepreneur to realize the implementation gain of his project, equity also provides
insurance. A government aiming at extracting the surplus from entrepreneurs has
thus no reason to tax income generated by different means of financing at the same
rate.
The rationale for a. government to aim at extracting surplus, though, is less obvi-
ous: Risk-averse entrepreneurs whose projects differ in expected returns, typically
differ in their willingness to pay for insurance of the same risk. Yet, if financial mar-
kets are competitive and insurance can be obtained at actuarially fair terms, every
such entrepreneur prefers equity over debt. Perfect insurance is obtained only when
the complete ownership of the project is sold to an investor. However, if the char-
acteristics of projects are unobservable to investors ex-ante, catering to the different
entrepreneurs becomes a, problem of screening types. Leland and Pyle (1977) have
shown that in this case entrepreneurs with higher return projects will retain a larger
share of their project to signal their type to investors.
How does a tax discrimination between debt and equity influence the outcome of this
signaling game? M\uch along the lines of Spence (1973), using more debt to finance a
new investment is a costly. yet socially inefficient signal. It is wasteful, because the
risk-averse party needs to take more risk than if information were symmetric. Then,
subsidizing the wasteful signal might simply lead to an increased use of debt, but
most likely not to a difference in the outcome of the signaling game1 . However, this
logic only applies if debt receives an absolute subsidy. The typical corporate income
tax schedule instead entails only a relative subsidy of debt over equity.
In this paper, I show that the relative discrimination between debt and equity can
instead lead to a more efficient outcome. Adverse selection necessitates the use of
debt as a signal. The level of debt necessary for separation is thus dictated by the
incentive constraints of a screening problem. Competition between investors does
not allow for any further price discrimination between types - everyone receives his
equilibrium amount of insurance at actuarially fair terms. The government, however,
is not restricted to the prices dictated by competition. Instead, it can use differential
taxation to implement a form of price discrimination between types that resembles
the behavior of a monopolist. This degree of freedom allows additional manipulation
of the incentive constraints and can so lead to a lower overall use of debt. Such an
increase in efficiency requires to extract surplus from the entrepreneurs. While the
equilibrium with taxes can be more efficient than the competitive equilibrium, it over-
all distributes away from the entrepreneurs and toward other parts of the economy
(not modeled here). Studies comparing monopolistic versus competitive insurance
markets come to similar conclusions (e.g. Stiglitz (1977), Dahlby (1987), de Feo and
Hindriks (2009)).
The optimal discrimination between types generally calls for a non-linear tax on cor-
'There are two caveats: First, if the entrepreneurs' preferences exhibit increasing absolute risk aver-
sion, a, linear subsidy on debt might draw in more lower types, thereby weakening the signal. At the
shares of retained equity that the high types are able to afford when trading off their risk aversion
against the combined incentives for using debt (the signaling value and the tax incentives), investors
might not be able to infer their types anymore, as the same tax subsidy might have led to lower
types retaining the same shares of their projects. A separating equilibrium might then fail to exist.
Second, the tax schedule would have to include a no-arbitrage condition, so that types can take out
at most so much debt to bridge the gap in financing that arose due to a lower equity issue. With
a tax subsidy, the highest types, who would be willing to keep almost all the ownership of their
project will run into that constraint. They cannot increase the share of debt any higher to separate
themselves from lower types, some pooling at the top might result.
porate income. I show that since entrepreneurs separate along their debt-to-equity
ratios, the optimal tax schedule is isomorphic to one that taxes the fraction of in-
come generated with equity differently from that generated with debt financing. In
such a, schedule, each type faces a higher tax rate on equity-financed income than
on debt-financed income, because the surplus generated by equity financing is larger
(implementation and insurance gains). In some cases, even a linear schedule with
separate tax rates on the fraction of income generated by debt versus equity and a
debt bias, approximates the optimal non-linear tax schedule that maximizes revenue.
Related Literature
The modern discussion about what determines the capital structure of corporations
started with the seminal contribution of Modigliani and Miller (1958). They state
that in an efficient market and in absence of taxes, bankruptcy and agency costs, and
asymmetric information, the value of the firm is invariant with respect to its capital
structure. Relaxing any of these conditions in turn and analyzing the resulting opti-
mal capital structure has since been a major focus of the corporate finance literature.
Harris and Raviv (1991) provide a comprehensive overview.
Many tax codes favor debt financing over equity. For corporations, interest pay-
ments on loans are to a large extend deductible from the tax base, while dividend
returns to equity holders are not. In the US, Graham (2000) estimates the tax bene-
fits for debt to amount to 9.7% of firm value. de Mooij (2011) reports that the cost of
equity-financed investment was higher than that of debt-financed investment in 2007
for firms in the US, Japan, and the EU-27. Bradley et al. (1984) survey the large
literature that has investigated the effects of this discrimination between means of
financing. The general argument is that firms choose the optimal level of debt trading
off tax incentives against the potential costs of financial distress resulting from debt
financing.
Whether firms do indeed base their choice of capital structure on the tax incen-
tives for debt has long been questioned2 . However, recent studies do find evidence
for the hypothesis that "the desirability of debt finance at the margin increases with
the firm's effective marginal tax rate on deductible interest" (MacKie-Mason (1990),
p.1482). The behavioral response of firms to the "debt bias" has been quantified
most recently by Gorden and Lee (2001, 2007). They estimate that shifting from
the average tax distortion to no tax distortion would reduce debt-to-capital ratios
by 0.022, implying that an additional 2.2% of capital would be financed with equity
rather than debt (Gordon and Lee (2007)).
These studies focus on the optimal decision of financing from the firm's point of
view, taking the debt bias in corporate income tax schedules as given. None of them
ask why it would be in the government's interest to implement such a discrimination.
Despite the arguments against this discrimination, it has persisted over time, and
might have even become larger (de Mooij (2011)). Yet, the general consensus is that
the discrimination between debt and equity should be eliminated (as for example ar-
gued by Auerbach et al. (2010) in the Mirrlees Review).
In contrast to the static tax incentive versus bankruptcy costs trade-off view, a large
stream of the corporate finance literature following Modigliani and Miller (1958) has
considered asymmetric inforniation between entrepreneurs and financiers and its ef-
fect on firms' capital structure. A firm's choice of the means of financing, so the main
argument, might contain information about its underlying value. The signal conveyed
to investors and the associated costs in terms of firm valuation are what determines
the decision to issue new equity or debt.
In a seninal contribution, 1\yers and Majluf (1984) have argued that information
asymmetries can explain why the stock price of a company typically declines after
new equity is issued. If investors cannot observe the underlying value of a firm (e.g.
M1lacKie-Mason (1990) briefly surveys Titman and Wessels (1988), Fischer et al. (1989). Ang and
Peterson (1986), Long and Malitz (1985), Bradley et al. (1984). and Marsh (1982) as "studies that
fail to find plausible or significant tax effects" (p.1471).
the quality of a new project for which the firm seeks financing), they will factor in
some probability that the entrepreneur or manager of the firm is behaving opportunis-
tically, issuing shares when they are overvalued. Issuing debt does not affect the price
of financing in the same way - the value of debt, especially safe or highly rated debt,
is largely unaffected by a change in the stock price. A number of studies have tested
the implications of this theory empirically, and have found evidence for stock price
decreases related to new equity issues (see Dierkens (1991) for a summary). Myers
(1984) therefore proposes a "pecking order" of corporate finance. According to this
theory, firms finance new projects with internal fund first, and only after exhausting
them seek outside capital, first in the form of safe debt and only when absolutely
necessary through new equity. These papers consider firms as risk-neutral agents.
One important difference between debt and equity, however, is the amount of risk the
entrepreneur can shift to the investor.
On the investment side of the financing transaction. Gordon and Bradford (1980)
have considered a model with risk-averse investors. They conclude that an investor's
portfolio mix of stocks and bonds will depend on the tax rates he faces as well as his
risk-aversion. When tax rates are not linear and absolute risk aversion is not perfectly
constant, the individually optimal mix will depend on the overall size of the portfolio.
Leland and Pyle (1977) instead consider a setup with risk-averse entrepreneurs that
is most closely related to the one presented here. In this case, everything else equal,
debt is a less attractive means to raise capital, because the entrepreneur has to bear
more risk compared to selling shares of his firm. The authors then show that retaining
a higher stake in their firm can serve as a signal of confidence to investors, so that
entrepreneurs with higher quality projects would be willing to retain higher shares
of equity (and instead issue debt to meet their financing needs) simply to separate
themselves from lower type entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs weigh the benefit from re-
ceiving more favorable terms of financing (due to a, higher market valuation of their
firm) against the cost of having to bear more risk. This finding parallels those of the
classic insurance literature pioneered by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), as well as the
literature on education as signaling device initiated by Spence (1973). Accordingly,
the results of the presented paper relate to findings of the insurance literature that
compares monopolistic and competitive provision, first introduced by Stiglitz (1977)
and Dahlby (1987), and more recently generalized by Chade and Schlee (2011) and
de Feo and Hindriks (2009).
Recently, other authors have considered the optimal taxation point of view to cor-
porate income taxation in setups with asymmetric information. The main concern
of this literature has been an inefficient entry of entrepreneurs in models of occupa-
tional choice. Gathak et al. (2007) show that if entrepreneurs differ along only one
dimension, a lump-sum tax on entrepreneurs can correct, an excessive entry of low
type entrepreneurs. Scheuer (2011) investigates a model where entrepreneurs differ
along two dimensions. Then, credit market imperfections lead to the government
optimally intervening with a nonlinear subsidy on entrepreneurial profits, due to an
inefficient entry of entrepreneurial types at both ends of the ability distribution. None
of these papers derives an optimal tax schedule that involves a discrimination between
debt and equity. However, contrary to this paper, they all consider risk-neutral en-
trepreneurs, and therefore disregard the potential of tax discrimination the dimension
of risk aversion.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In section 2.2, I set up a model
reminiscent of Leland and Pyle (1977) where risk-averse entrepreneurs with hetero-
geneous projects seek financing from competitive investors. Asymmetric information
about the quality of projects results in an adverse selection problem. To illustrate
my point, I employ a setup with two types of entrepreneurs. Section 2.3 describes the
competitive equilibrium in this economy. Section 2.4 then analyzes a government's
opportunities to intervene. It is first shown that the revenue maximizing tax schedule
implements a price discrimination between types and generally leads to a. different
level of debt for the high return type entrepreneur than in the competitive equilib-
rium. Section 2.4.1 then proceeds to show that a tax schedule with a debt bias can
be designed to collect the same revenue as the optimal tax schedule. Finally, section
2.4.2 analyzes a specific example in which even a linear tax schedule with different
rates on debt versus equity generated income approximates the optimal non-linear
schedule. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Setup
Consider an economy populated by entrepreneurs who seek financing for their projects
and investors who compete to provide the funds.
Entrepreneurs
There exists a. continuum of entrepreneurs of size one. Each entrepreneur owns the
idea for a project, but has no initial wealth to cover the required setup costs I to im-
plement his project. Entrepreneurs are risk-averse, their utility function u is increas-
ing, strictly concave, differentiable and exhibits non-increasing absolute risk aversion
(NIARA).
Entrepreneurs are of two different types, indicated by index i E {L, H}. 3 and (1 -#)
are the respective shares in the population. Types differ with respect to the return
their project can generate. In particular, I assume that an implemented project pro-
duces a gross return of
Y(Bi, E) = I + 62 + E (2.1)
Here, O is the individual mean return (net of the setup costs I) that differs with the
type of the entrepreneur, and is known to him even before the implementation of the
project. E represents an aggregate shock, its realization is unknown to everybody at
the time of interaction between entrepreneurs and investors.
I assume that
(Al) E C {e, -c}, with E[E] = 0.
(A2) c is small compared to O6: 0 < E << OL < OH.
Assumption (Al) implies that a risk-neutral agent would disregard the aggregate
shock in his optimization of ex-ante utility. However, since entrepreneurs are risk-
averse, they do take the aggregate risk into account when deciding whether to imple-
ment their project. Assumption (A2) implies that the initial setup costs I are always
recovered. Every project has a positive return.
While without any initial wealth, entrepreneurs do have outside options, denoted
. For example, one might think about entrepreneurs being able to implement their
project elsewhere in the world, or to simply remain in the labor force of the economy's
productive sector. I assume that
(A3) 0i < Ci, where Ci is the certainty equivalent defined by u(Ci) = E{u(O6 + E)];
(A4) CH > OL-
Assumption (A3) ensures that entrepreneurs are willing to implement their projects
if they are offered financing at sufficiently good terms. Assumption (A4) puts a joint
restriction on L OH (the spread of the mean returns), the aggregate risk E and the
concavity of the entrepreneurs' utility function. It essentially places a lower bound on
the spread of safe outside options. With this assumption, I am restricting attention
to cases where an equilibrium always exists.
Investors
The financial market consists of a large number of risk-neutral investors, each with
unlimited funds. They can either invest at the safe gross interest rate normalized to
(A5) R = 1
or finance projects.
Investors can offer financing contracts to entrepreneurs. A financial contract is a
pair (x, T) c (0, 1) x R. I denote with x E (0, 1) the share of the project that remains
in the ownership of the entrepreneur. Thus, x = 0 corresponds to an equity contract
where complete ownership of the project is transferred to the investor, while x = 1
denotes a pure debt contract where the entrepreneur remains the owner of his project.
x is thus a measure of the degree of insurance the entrepreneur purchases (where a
smaller x corresponds to more insurance).
In any case, the contract specifies a fixed payment T to the entrepreneur, which
is net of the setup cost I. It is without loss of generality to consider only contracts
where T is not a function of the realization of the aggregate shock E3 . It is useful to
think of T as reflecting the price the entrepreneur pays for a financing service with
a degree of insurance x. Since realized output Y perfectly reveals all private infor-
mation, contracts must be restricted to not be contingent on it. Otherwise, a simple
penalty for lying about the true type would easily circumvent the adverse selection
problem that is at the heart of this study. Realized payoffs do depend on realized
output for all players holding parts of the ownership rights.
Timing
The strategic interaction considered is the following:
1. Entrepreneurs learn their type.
2. Investors offer a set of contracts, denoted X {(x, T) C (0, 1) x R}. They are
subsequently committed to honor the terms of the offers.
3. Entrepreneurs choose whether to implement their projects (let i E {0, 1} repre-
sent that decision), and if so which contract to accept. They can accept only one
3In principle, a debt contract could specify a T that depends on the realization of E. This would be
the case if entrepreneurs are asked to pay an interest rate on their debt that is so high that they
might not be able to afford it in the bad state. However, competition between investors will ensure
that interest rates on debt contracts are at least equal to the safe rate R = 1. Assumption (A2)
then ensures that limited liability is never a binding constraint.
contract 4 . Accordingly, payments T are made and the projects implemented.
4. Aggregate uncertainty is realized and returns are distributed according to the
contracted ownership of shares.
The concept of competition between investors is similar to that introduced by Roth-
schild and Stiglitz (1976). As is well know, in this setup an equilibrium might not
exist. Assumption (A4) does ensure, however, that an equilibrium always exists'.
2.3 Equilibrium without Taxes
In the last active stage, each entrepreneur makes an implementation decision (i E
{ 0, 11 and decides which contract to sign, taking the set of offered contracts as given.
He solves:
max E[u(x(O + E) + T)] + (1 - () u(V)
,(x.T )
s.t. E {0, 1} and (x, T) E X (2.2)
The financial market in this economy is competitive. Thus, even though investors
are maximizing their expected profits, in equilibrium they will make zero profits
in expectation. Entrepreneurs on the other hand are risk-averse, how much of the
aggregate risk they have to bear plays a, decisive role in their implementation and
financing decision.
Definition 2
An equilibrium is a set of contracts X - {(xZT) E (0,1) x Ri = L, H} and an
implementation decision (i of each entrepreneur such that:
(i) entrepreneurs maximize their expected utility;
(ii) investors make zero expected profits.
4 This is a short cut to assuming that trades are observable.
'Classic (e.g. Riley (1979)) as well as more recent studies (e.g. Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002)) have
modified the Rothschild-Stiglitz concept of competitive equilibrium to deal with the non-existence
of equilibrium problem. The general consensus is that there always exists a. separating equilibrium.
2.3.1 Observable Types
In a first-best world, investors are able to observe an entrepreneur's type and can
offer type-specific contracts. Since investors are competitive, the optimal contract for
a type i entrepreneur maximizes his expected utility, subject a zero expected profit
constraint for the investor. The implementation decision is made taking into account
the entrepreneur's outside option 42:
max (i E[u(xi(Oi + E) + Ti)] + (1 - (i) U(0i)
s.t. (1 - zi)6; - Ti > 0 (2.3)
Lemma 10
If types are observable, in equilibrium all projects are implemented in the economy.
All entrepreneurs obtain full insurance at actuarially fair terms: (I 1 and (x., T*) =
(0, O6) Vi.
Proof: Suppose that (= 1. Then, the optimal contract solves
1
max -I[u(xi(Oi + c) + T) + u(xi(O - () + Ti)]
(xiTi) 2
1
s.t. -[u(xi(Oi + c) + T) + u(xi(O - c) + Ti)] > u()i/) (2.4)
2
(1 - Xi)0i - Ti > 0 (2.5)
The first-order conditions for this optimization are:
1
[xiJ -(1 + p) [u'(xi(Oi + e) + T)(Oi + c) + n'(xi(O6 - c) + T)(Oi - e)] =AO (2.6)2
1[T] -(1 + i) [u'(xi(Oi + c) + T) + n'(xi(01 - e) + T)] =A (2.7)2
where y and A are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the individual rationality
constraint of the entrepreneur (2.4) and the zero expected profit condition for the
investor (2.5) respectively. These necessary conditions for optimality require
0i =u'(xi(O + c) + T)(Oi + c) + u'(xi(Oi - e) + Ti)(Oi - )(28)
u'(xi()i + )+ Ti) + u'(xi(O -)+ T)
which implies xo = 0. The zero expected profit constraint (2.5) determines Ti* = 64. A
contract (xi = 0, T = O6) satisfies the individual rationality constraint of entrepreneur
i, and so he optimally chooses ( 1. O1
Borch's Rule6 of optimal risk sharing implies that the risk-neutral party (here the
investor) should bear all the risk. Each entrepreneurial type receives full insurance.
Competition between investors implies that in equilibrium entrepreneurs will be of-
fered actuarially fair insurance. Being offered such favorable terms, all entrepreneurs
optimally decide to implement their projects, and sell their firms to an investor in an
equity contract.
Financial contracts serve two purposes: They provide financing to set up the project
as well as insurance against the aggregate risk. In a first-best world, one could think
of separate markets for these two tasks. Each entrepreneur would then issue safe
debt contract to finance the setup costs I and sign a separate insurance contract.
The first-best allocation in such a world would be equivalent to the presented setup.
2.3.2 Unobservable Types
Suppose now that investors in the economy cannot observe an entrepreneur's type,
and so are uncertain about the mean expected return of their investment when offer-
ing to buy a share of equity. The first-best set of contracts can not be an equilibrium
anymore: Since Tj < T*, every entrepreneur would claim to have a high return idea
to maximize the price he can fetch from selling the ownership rights to his project.
The investor's zero expected profit condition would then be violated, he would make
certain losses. Recall that while realized returns are perfectly informative about the
6See Borch (1962).
entrepreneur's type, investors are by assumption precluded from offering contracts
with payments T contingent on realized returns.
The equilibrium implementation decisions and set of contracts in this adverse se-
lection problem are the solution to a standard screening problem. Since preferences
exhibit NIARA, they satisfy the single-crossing property. By the Revelation Prin-
ciple 7 it suffices to design contracts that are incentive compatible for each type of
entrepreneur to choose the contract that is meant for him.
3 {{LI[U(XL (OL + E)+TL)] + (1 - L) U(4L)}+
max
.x (1-/){HIE[UH(OH+E)+TH)1 + (1 - H)U(/H)}
s.t. LE[U(XL (OL +E) +TL)] LEU(XH(OL + E) +TH)1 (2.9)
'H IE[U(xH OH + E) + Tj)J >H IE[u(XL(OH + E) + TL)] (2.10)
( - XL)OL] + H(l - 0)( - XH)OH > L TL + 1IIBTH (2.11)
The optimization is now further constrained by (2.9) and (2.10), the incentive coinpat-
ibility constraints for entrepreneurial types L and H respectively. Investors breaking
even in expectation is ensured by constraint (2.11). With the added complication of
an information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and investors, not all entrepreneurs
obtain full insurance in equilibrium:
Lemma 11
If types are unobservable, in the unique equilibrium all projects are implemented:
j = 1 for i = L. H. In particular.
(i) type L entrepreneurs obtain full insurance at actuarially fair terms:
(XL,TL) ( 0,.0L)
7See for example Mverson (1979) and Harris and Townsend (1981).
(ii) type H entrepreneurs obtain partial insurance at actuarially fair terms:
(XH, TH) (0< XH 1,(1 - XH) OH)
Proof: See appendix 2.6.1.
Even though investors are risk-neutral, they cannot provide full insurance to all en-
trepreneurs. Due to asymmetric information, full insurance for all types could only
be granted in a pooling equilibrium, where type H entrepreneurs receive less than
actuarially fair insurance and subsidize type L entrepreneurs. Just as in the canonical
Rothschild-Stiglitz model, such a pooling contract is not an equilibrium: A contract
that offers a little less insurance and attracts only high types, without subsidizing low
types, is a profitable deviation. This type of cream-skimming by investors rules out
a pooling equilibrium.
Just as in the insurance literature, in the separting equilibrium, higher types (i.e.
lower risks) receive less insurance. This property of the equilibrium parallels the find-
ings of Leland and Pyle (1977): Higher type entrepreneurs retain a higher share of
their projects to signal their type to the market.
Competition between investors drives their expected profits to zero. All the sur-
plus generated from implementing projects and providing (partial) insurance accrue
to the entrepreneurs.
2.4 Equilibrium with Taxes
Suppose the government of the economy is aiming at extracting the surplus en-
trepreneurs make. One might think of entrepreneurs as being foreign to the economy,
and free to set up their projects anywhere in the world. A government might then
want to ensure that some (or all) of the surplus generated through the use of the econ-
omy's financial market are recovered. More generally, one might also think about a
government trying to redistribute away from entrepreneurs to other parts of the econ-
omy (not modeled in the presented setup).
I assume that the government announces a tax schedule T at the beginning of time
and is subsequently committed to it. Taxes can in principle depend on types, and
on the specifics of the financing contract (x, T), and are always collected from the
entrepreneur. Investors and entrepreneurs take the announced taxes as given in their
decisions. I denote the problem of a type i entrepreneur with Uj:
max (E[u(x(O + E) +T- (x,T,O))] + (1 -)u()
,(x,T)
s.t. ( E {O, 1} and (x,T) E X
As before, the optimal financing contracts are found as a solution to the screening
problem (2.9)-(2.11), where investors take the effect of the tax schedule on the en-
trepreneurs' decision problem into account. I denote the investor's problem by P.
The government then solves:
max 3fLT(ztLTL,OL)± (1 -+ )( HT(XH,TH,OH)
f r(xTO)}
s.t. (j E argmaxUj Vi (2.12)
X E argmaxiP (2.13)
The government maximizes tax revenue and only cares about the entrepreneurs' util-
ity insofar as it would like their participation constraints to be satisfied.
Definition 3
An equilibrium with taxes is a set of contracts X = {(xi, T) E (0, 1) x R, i = L, H},
an implementation decision (j of each entrepreneur, and a tax schedule {T(X , T, 00}}
such that:
(i) entrepreneurs maximize their expected utility, taking taxes as given;
(ii) investors make zero expected profits;
(iii) the government mnaxiimizes tax revenue.
The equilibrium is comparable in structure to the competitive equilibrium. However,
the government will tax entrepreneurial surplus.
Lemma 12
When types are unobservable, in the equilibrium with taxes all projects are imple-
mented: i = 1 for i = L, H. In particular,
(i) type L entrepreneurs obtain full insurance and investors pay actuarially fair
terms:
(xL,) (0, OL)
(ii) type H entrepreneurs obtain partial insurance and investors pay actuarially fair
terms:
(XH, H) (0< XH 1 ,(1 xiI)OiH);
(iii) type H entrepreneurs will be taxed so that they are indifferent between imple-
menting their projects or their outside option.
Proof: See appendix 2.6.2.
This equilibrium structure is analogous to the one in Stiglitz (1977), who analyzes
a monopoly insurance problem. Indeed, the government's objective to maximize tax
revenue coincides with that of a monopolist investor. As in Stiglitz (1977), contracts
in the equilibrium with taxes (denoted with superscript G) will generally differ from
those in the competitive equilibrium without taxes (denoted with superscript C).
Proposition 6
Generically, XG : XC.
Proof: See appendix 2.6.3.
In the equilibrium without taxes, it follows from competition between investors that
debt earns no interest beyond R = 1 and all insurance is sold at actuarially fair
terms. Insurance coverage for the high types is determined solely by the incentive
constraints of the low types. Competition between investors leaves no room for price
discrimination between types of entrepreneurs. The government however doesn't face
competition. Using taxes, it can implement effective prices that differ from those con-
sistent with competition. It essentially acts like a monopolist, who is able to charge
differential mark-ups. This degree of freedom allows the government to manipulate
the incentive constraint of the low types such that a different level of insurance for
the high type emerges in equilibrium.
Corollary 1
When TH > TL, type H entrepreneurs receive more insurance than in the competitive
equilibrium (xH <H4)
Proof: See appendix 2.6.4.
The possibility of an increase in efficiency again parallels findings in the insurance
literature. For insurance markets with adverse selection, it has been shown by Dahlby
(1987) that coverage for the low risk types is higher when purchased from a monopo-
list insurer, rather than in a competitive market. More generally, de Feo and Hindriks
(2009) show that monopolists are often more efficient at providing insurance under
adverse selection than a competitive market.
It should be noted that while the equilibrium with taxation can be more efficient
than the competitive equilibrium, the necessary discrimination has distributional con-
sequences. The government's objective is to maximize the revenue extracted from the
entrepreneurs. One might interpret this as a re-distributional objective away from
entrepreneurs and toward other parts of the economy (not modeled in this paper).
2.4.1 Implementing the Optimal Non-linear Tax Schedule
Lemma 12 stated that the government is able to extract all the surplus from the
entrepreneurs. Generally, a non-linear tax schedule will be optimal to achieve that
objective. It will satisfy the individual rationality constraints for both types with
equality, so that no surplus is left to the entrepreneurs:
U(OL - TL) U(4'L) (2.14)
E[u(OH - rH + x' E)] U()H) (2.15)
Proposition 7
The optimal tax schedule {TL, TH } is isomorphic to one that taxes the fraction of
income generated by equity at a higher rate than the fraction of income generated by
debt.
Proof: Define Ri as the absolute risk premium type i would be willing to pay to avoid
the risk he would be exposed to from holding all shares of his project:
E[u(Gi- Ti + E)] = u(Oi -T, - Ri) (2.16)
Since the aggregate risk is small (by assumption (A2)), the absolute risk premium
can be approximated by
1
Ri ~ riVar(E) (2.17)2
where ri = - is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion for type i
evaluated at O -ri. Using this definition, the optimal non-linear tax schedule satisfies
T - pi - (X )2 Ri for i L, H (2.18)
By assumption (A3), each entrepreneur's outside option is @i < Cj. It can always be
written as )i = 63i 0 - Ri. Thus, the surplus to be taxed away is
Ti(1 - 6)O + (1 - (XG) 2 )Ri for i = L, H (2.19)
The first summand, (1 - 6i)Oi, represents the implementation gain, i.e. the surplus
generated only from obtaining financing for the setup costs and so being able to
implement the project. The rest, (1 - (XG) 2 )Ri. represents the insurance gain. i.e.
the additional surplus generated from receiving insurance. From this intuition, it is
clear that the same tax revenue r, can be generated by taxing the fractions of income
generated by debt or equity at different rates:
x7 O6D + (1 _ XG)o E
= (1 - 6i)O, + (1 - (XG) 2 )Ri
x=(1 - oi)Oi + (1 - XG)(1 - o&)9i + (1 - ()R
Here r-D is the tax rate applied to the share of income retained by the entrepreneur. It
taxes the surplus generated with debt, i.e. only a fraction of the implementation gain.
TE is the tax rate applied to the fraction of income sold as equity to the investors. It
taxes the surplus generated by equity, which consists of both a proportional fraction
of the implementation gain as well as the insurance gain. Notice that
ri 1 - 6 (2.20)
O 6 +( (G i- (2.21)6;(1 - xG )
Thus, the optimal tax schedule r, is isomorphic to one that taxes the fraction of in-
come generated by equity at a, higher rate than income generated by debt. O
Proposition 7 states that a tax schedule with a debt bias might indeed be optimal,
given the government's objective of extracting all surplus from the entrepreneurs. In
reality, the debt bias in a typical corporate income tax schedule takes a particular
form: It allows the costs of debt to be deducted from the tax base, whereas payments
to equity holders are (to a large extend) considered taxable profits. In the model,
such a debt bias would occur when a corporate income tax rate Ti would be levied on
O6+ Ti, i.e. on all of the entrepreneurs generated income before paying out any equity
holders. The entrepreneur thus earns (0 + Ti)(1 - ti) - (1 - x')2, where competition
determines Ti = (1 - xo)60(1 - -i). This results in a double taxation of the fraction
of income generated by equity financing:
(0 + TX)(1 - ii) - (1 - F)i x64(1 - Ti) + (1 -- x)(1 - )2 (2.23)
=Xq6(1- fT) + (1 - XG)Oi(1 _ TE) (2.24)
with rD < E8. Thus, this particular form of a debt bias is nothing different than
taxing the fraction of income generated with equity at a higher rate than the fraction
generated with debt. The debt bias observed in many tax codes might be optimal, at
least in structure, to maximize revenue generated from corporate income taxation.
2.4.2 Continuum of Types with CARA Preferences
So far, I have shown that the optimal tax schedule to extract all surplus generated for
the entrepreneurs can be implemented using separate tax rates for fractions of income
corresponding to the share of ownership retained by the entrepreneur or sold to an
investor. The marginal tax rates on these fractions of income differ, because with the
means of financing, the surplus generated differs: While both debt and equity help
the entrepreneur to realize the implementation gain, only equity provides insurance
against the aggregate risk, and so generates additional surplus. Thus, the tax rate
on debt financed income will be lower than that on equity financed income for each
type. However, generally, these tax rates still depend on types. So the question arises
why the government would postulate a tax schedule with two separate tax rates per
type when it could also just announce one tax payment ri per type that incorporates
all surplus generated.
In what follows, I show that in some cases, a sinple linear tax schedule for debt-
financed and equity-financed income can approximate the optimal non-linear corpo-
rate tax. Since the fractions of income financed with equity vary with type, the
81n reality, there are many rules of what exactly can or cannot be deducted from the tax base, so
that rE will never be exactly 2TD (D)2 as suggested by this simple example.
effective tax entrepreneurs face is still non-linear:
Xi0i(1 - r') + (I - Xi0i( - rE) = Oi(1 - ri) (2.25)
where Ti = TE + Xi(rD _ TE) (2.26)
Suppose there exist a continuum of different types of entrepreneurs, index by 0 E [0, 0],
0 < 0 < 0 < 1, with a density function f(0) that is strictly positive, continuous and
differentiable everywhere, and satisfies a monotone likelihood ration property. Stiglitz
(1977) showed that under these conditions, a fully separating equilibrium exists and
is such that the lowest type 0 receives full insurance, whereas all other types receive
only partial insurance coverage decreasing with type. Chade and Schlee (2011) more
recently extended the analysis to provide conditions for full separation under more
general type distributions.
Moreover, suppose that entrepreneurial preferences exhibit constant absolute risk
aversion, and that each entrepreneur's outside option is a constant fraction of the
certainty equivalent his project generates, i.e. it can be expressed as 'i = 60 - R.
Again, R is the absolute risk premium, which is now constant for all agents. Under
these assumptions, the implementation gain of an entrepreneur is proportional to his
type, while the insurance gain depends only the degree of insurance coverage. Fur-
ther, consider a. population of entrepreneurs with 0 < 20.
From equation (2.18), we know that the optimal tax schedule collects revenue
T(0) = (1 - 6)0 + (1 - x(0)2 )R (2.27)
from a type 0 entrepreneur. The revenue collected with linear tax rates on debt and
equity financed income is
x(0)TD + (1 - x(0))OrE (2.28)
The tax rates TD and TE are pinned down by the implementation gain and the
insurance gain from full insurance. A type that signs an equilibrium contract without
any insurance (x(0) = 1, T(0) = 0), faces only the tax rate rD, which extracts the
full implementation gain:
(2.29)
The lowest type receives full insurance, so he realizes the implementation gain and
the full insurance gain, and faces only tax rate TE, so that
OT E(6)6±R T~ 6 +>TDR
0
(2.30)
With these tax rates, the surplus extracted from any type 0 with a contract (0 <
x(0) < 1, T(0)) generates tax revenue that is approximately the same as the optimal
tax revenue in equation (2.27):
X(0)0T D + (1 - X(O))OT
Q(T E _ X(0)(TD - TE
0(1 - o + (1 -x(6))I
When the spread of mean returns is small, a
applied to the fractions of income generated by
approximates the optimal non-linear tax sched1
E 6)0-+ (1 -X(0) 2)R
(1 - 6)0 + (1 - X(0) 2 )R
( +( )) (2.31)
linear schedule of tax rates {TD TE}
debt and equity financing respectively
2.5 Discussion
Iany governments discriminate between debt and equity financing when taxing cor-
porate income. Conventional wisdom however suggests that the means of financing
should be treated equivalently. I present a rationale for why a government might
choose to discriminate between debt and equity: Debt and equity financing generate
OTrD _ 1-60 - D =I_
different levels of surplus for the entrepreneur. While both help him to realize the
implementation gain of his project, equity also provides insurance. A government
aiming at extracting the surplus from the entrepreneurs thus has no reason to tax
income generated by different means of financing at the same rate.
A difference in surplus generated by equity versus debt only occurs when entrepreneurs
are risk-averse. Yet, if insurance can be obtained at actuarially fair terms (as is the
case in competitive financial markets), every entrepreneur prefers equity over debt.
It is then due to an adverse selection problem that different types of entrepreneurs
choose different debt-to-equity ratios: The associated screening problem results in
an equilibrium that separates entrepreneurs using the share of retained earnings as
a screening device. The level of debt necessary for separation is solely determined
by the incentive constraints. Competition between investors does not allow for any
further price discrimination between types. The government, however, can introduce
taxes such that different, types effectively face different mark-ups over actuarially fair
insurance terms. This additional opportunity for discrimination can relax incentive
constraints and lead to a more efficient outcome, with a higher overall degree of in-
surance.
To implement the optimal discrimination scheme between types, the government can
make use of the fact that separation occurs along the debt-to-equity ratio. A differ-
ential taxation of income generated with debt versus income generated with equity
financing is one way to achieve optimal discrimination. This mechanism provides
another less obvious justification for a debt bias in corporate income taxation.
It should be noted that while the equilibrium with taxation can be more efficient
than the competitive equilibrium, the necessary discrimination has distributional
consequences. I analyzed a government whose objective is to maximize the revenue
extracted from the entrepreneurs. One might interpret this as a re-distributional ob-
jective away from entrepreneurs and toward other parts of the economy (not modeled
in this paper).
Alternatively, one might consider an economy that would like to attract foreign en-
trepreneurs to set up their firms in the country. In search for an opportunity to
finance their projects, entrepreneurs can decide where in the world to set up their
firm. They make this decision merely based on expected utility maximization, taking
into account any uncertainty they might face, and optimizing over the terms of financ-
ing they are offered by investors in different countries. If investors in the economy are
competitive, they might well be able to attract foreign entrepreneurs. However, all
the surplus generated accrues to the entrepreneur, i.e. outside the economy. The gov-
ernment might then try to regain some of that surplus to distribute among members
of the economy.
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Proof of Lemma 11
First, I show that all projects are always inplemented: Assumption (A2) implies that
every project has a positive return. Competition between investors and assumption
(A5) then imply that every entrepreneur can always issue (safe) debt at the gross
interest rate R = 1. Thus, assumption (A3) implies that every project generates at
least a positive implementation gain for the entrepreneur, even if he cannot obtain
any insurance.
Second, I establish that the only equilibrium is a separating equilibrium. Given
that all projects are implemented, the screening problem (2.9) through (2.11) can be
rewritten as
max B E[u(XL(OL + E) + TL)] + (1
x -B#)E[u(xH(OH+ E) + TH)]
s.t. E[n(XL (OL + E) + TL)] U(<L)
E[u(xH(OH + E) + TH)] > u(lnH)
E[I(xL(OL + E) + TL)] > E[u(xH(OL + E) + TH)1
E[u (xH(OH + E) + TH)] >- E[I(XL(OH + E) + TL)]
[(1XL)OL + ( -x3)L 1 - XH)OH] 3 TL + 13 TH
(2.32)
(2.33)
(2.34)
(2.35)
(2.36)
This is a standard screening problem where maximization of entrepreneurial surplus
is subject to individual rationality and incentive conipatibility constraints, as well as
a zero profit condition for investors. As in the classic Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)
setup, a pooling contract cannot be an equilibrium. Due to competition between
investors, the only candidate pooling contract would offer full insurance at average
actuarially fair terms:
(x, T) = (0, 3 L + (1 - 3 )OH) (2-37)
High types would obtain full insurance but subsidize low types. A profitable deviation
is possible. There exists a contract (x', T') that offer less than full insurance and
satisfies:
E[u(x'OH + T'+ x'E)| > U(/ 30L + (1 - O)OH) (2-38)
E[u(x'OL + T' + x'E)| < U(OL + (1 - O)OH) (2.39)
Only high types would take up this contract, the investor could offer T' so that the
first condition binds, and make a profit. Low types would stick with the pooling
contract, which then makes certain losses. Thus, the pooling contract cannot be an
equilibrium.
Next, it is shown that the only separating equilibrium must be such that type L
entrepreneurs obtain full insurance. and type H entrepreneurs only partial insurance.
In a separating equilibrium, the zero profit condition must hold for each type sepa-
rately, so that T is pinned down by
Ti = (1 - xi)Oj (2.40)
Competition implies that one type will get full insurance. Otherwise a profit could be
made by offering full insurance to one type. However, contracts (xH 0, TH OH)
(full insurance) and (xL > 0, TL - XL)OL) (partial insurance) can never satisfy
type L's incentive compatibility constraint (2.34):
E[u(XLOL + TL ± xLE)] = E[U(OL + XLE)| < U(OL) < 1(OH) (2.41)
Thus, a separating equilibrium must be such that (XL, TL) = (0, OL), i.e. type L
receives full insurance. Since type H entrepreneurs are also risk-averse, they strictly
prefer higher levels of insurance if offered at actuarially fair terms. The terms are
ensured by competition, so that the unique separating equilibrium is that with the
highest possible level of insurance for type H. It is pinned down by the incentive
constraint of type L (2.34):
U(OL) = E[U(XHOL + (1 - XH)OH) + xHE] (2.42)
It remains to be shown that such a separating equilibrium always exists. In Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1976), a separating equilibrium might fail to exist, if the terms offered
to type H are so bad that they would prefer to pool with type L. Here, the worst
terms that could possibly be offered to type H entrepreneurs would be no insurance,
i.e. (XH, T11 ) = (1,0). By assumption (A4), a type H entrepreneur would still prefer
that contract over the full insurance contract offered to type L (XL, TL) - (0, OL):
E[U(OH + E)] = u(CH) > U(OL) (2.43)
This concludes the proof.
2.6.2 Proof of Lemma 12
The proof is analogous to that for lemma (11). It remains true that most surplus
is generated when one type gets full insurance and the other as much as possible,
given incentive compatibility constraints. One must simply note that the government
cannot increase revenue by implementing a tax such that type H entrepreneurs get
full insurance and type L entrepreneurs get only partial insurance. To make such
contracts incentive compatible, the government would have to pay a subsidy to type
L entrepreneurs without generating more revenue. Point (iii) is straight forward to
see: the government's objective is to maximize revenue, so that leaving any surplus
to type H would be wasteful.
2.6.3 Proof of Lemma 6
In the competitive equilibrium, type H's contract (z4 , TH) = (z4 > 0, (1 - 4 f4 )OH)
was such that type L's incentive constraint (2.9) binds:
E[(zC0OL + (1 - XH)OH + 4 E)] = U(OL) (2.44)
Define RX as the absolute risk premium type i would be willing to pay to avoid the
risk he would be exposed to from holding all shares of his project at contracts X:
E[u(Oi + E)] = u(O - RX) (2.45)
Since the aggregate risk is small (by assumption (A2)), the absolute risk premium
can be approximated as
Rx ~ -r Var(E)
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(2.46)
where r = - i is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion for type i
evaluated at the contract X. Using this definition, condition (2.44) can be rewritten
as:
u(xCHOL + (1 - xr)Of - (Xr) 2 RC) = U(OL)
Thus, xz solves
(1 - H)( -- L) - (z) 2 R2 =0
In the equilibrium with taxes, the incentive constraint is:
E[u(x OL + (1 - I54 )OH - TH + zE)] = U(L TL)
and z4 analogously solves
(1H- )(OH - OL) - ( 2 TH - TL
(1 - ) OL) - (z) 2 R) TH ~ TL + (HG)2 (Rf - RL)
(2.47)
(2.48)
(2.49)
(2.50)
(2.51)
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9Using that Var(xE) = x2 Var(E).
Thus, generally xG 54 , i.e. the equilibrium sets of contracts differ.
However, there might exist one specific parameterization such that z4 = X. Suppose
preferences are CARA, so that the absolute risk premium R is constant. If the surplus
taxed from both types is exactly the same, then the set of contracts is unchanged.
The surplus consists of implementation and insurance gain. The insurance gain with
CARA is proportional to the level of insurance obtained. The implementation gain
would have to be such that it exactly offsets the difference in insurance. While this
is possible, a tiny difference in outside options would already yield a different set of
contracts.
2.6.4 Proof of Lemma 1
In the competitive equilibrium, H solves (2.48):
(1 - 44)(OH - OL) - () 2 R = 0 (2.52)
whereas in the equilibrium with taxes, z4 solves (2.51):
(1 - z)(OH - OL) - (= 2 R TH - TL + (X ) 2( R - RC) (2.53)
Since preferences are NIARA, R' > Rj. Thus, when T > TL, the right hand side of
(2.53) is positive, so that x4 < 4 .
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Chapter 3
Adapting to Capitalism:
Private Health Insurance Uptake
Among Former East Germans
I study the differential reaction of former East and West Germans to a
series of health care reforms that started in 1997. Along with the grad-
ual decrease in coverage under the public health insurance system, former
East Germans were significantly less likely to sign complementary health
insurance contracts in the private market. I show that the differential up-
take rates of additional private insurance after the reforms are consistent
with a model in which agents optimize their individual insurance status
only if they are aware of the organizational form of the health care sys-
tem (or more generally the welfare state), and in which East Germans are
initially less likely to have the correct beliefs, but learn over time that in-
stitutions have changed and they are now responsible for optimizing their
insurance coverage. While it is widely recognized that the development of
new institutions in transition economies takes time, people's adjustment
to them has received little attention. This study provides evidence for the
existence of a substantial transition period in the individual adaptation
to new institutions.
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3.1 Introduction
When transitioning from socialism to a free-market economy, do people adapt to the
new circumstances immediately? Undoubtedly, major shifts in the political system
do not escape people's notice. They often follow extended demonstrations, spectacu-
lar coups, or even violent uprising. However, the institutional changes that go along
with this transition, although fundamental, may not be apparent immediately. For
instance, an all-encompassing welfare state with an extreme level of redistribution
is a core idea of socialism. Confronted with a capitalist system, do people under-
stand their new individual responsibility immediately, or do they adapt their decision
making over time? Economic transition consists of both the development of new in-
stitutions and people's adaptation to them. While it is now widely recognized that
the former takes time, the latter has received little attention so far. Using data on
uptake rates of private health insurance of former East and West Germans, I find
that the individual adjustment period can be substantial.
The case of Germany presents a unique opportunity to study the question. The
reunification of the socialist East with the capitalist West in 1990 came after 40 years
of separation1 . While in the past two decades many Eastern European countries have
started to transition from communism to western-oriented democracies, two charac-
teristics of the German case make it especially suitable to study people's reaction to
institutional change. First, the influence of socialism can be interpreted as an exoge-
nous shock. The division of Germany was not a choice of the German people, but
imposed by the Allied Forces, and the new border determined by where the forces
were standing at the end of World War II. During the time of separation, migration
Political separation of the two German states lasted for 40 years. After World War II, Germany
had been divided by the allied forces into four occupation zones, i.e. a British zone in the North
West, a French zone in the South West, a U.S. zone in the South, and a Soviet zone in the East of
Germany. Due to the aggravating political situation among the Soviet Union and the three Western
powers, the American and British zone were merged in 1946 and were joined by the French zone in
1947. In May 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was founded on this territory, while
in October 1949 the Eastern zone became the German Democratic Republic (GDR). However, only
the erection of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 completed the physical separation.
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was minimal2 . Reunification then came rather surprisingly. The large protest that
lead to the Fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 had started only two months
earlier. Reunification of the two German states was finalized a mere year later. For-
mer West Germans thus constitute a credible control group for former East Germans.
Second, with the Unification Treaty (1990), East Germany implemented the politi-
cal and economic system of the FRG in its pre-existing form. New institutions did
therefore not need to be developed; they were already well-functioning and rapidly
imposed onto the East German population. Any observed adaptation process can
thus be interpreted as people adjusting to the new institutions rather than the par-
allel development of these institutions.
I study the differential reaction of former East and West Germans to a series of
health care reforms that started in 1997. Before 1990, both German health care sys-
tems had provided almost universal coverage. Their organization however differed:
While in East Germany all health care provision had been state owned and health
care free to citizens, West Germany has had a market for health services, and a public
health insurance - funded out of payroll taxes - had provided extensive coverage to
the vast majority of the population. With reunification, the market-based system was
implemented in East Germany. However, since coverage remained de facto the same,
the institutional change may not have been immediately apparent to East Germans
at the time. It was not until 1997 that more than the organizational details of the
health insurance system changed. I find that following the reform shocks, along with
the decrease in coverage under the public health insurance system, former East Ger-
mans were significantly less likely to sign complementary health insurance contracts
in the private market than former West Germans. Such differences could be driven by
demographic factors, differences in risk attitudes, or aggregate economic effects that
differ between the Eastern and Western parts of Germany. However, the different
2 Until the fall of the Wall in 1989, migration was minimal in either direction due to violent military
border protection in the GDR, coupled with a rigorous restriction of the number of GDR, citizens
officially allowed to travel (Kisters and lofmnann (1998)). and very little migration from prospering
West Germany to the East (l\Iinz and Ulrich (1997)).
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reaction to the decrease in coverage could also be attributed to East Germans being
less aware of the fact that they are now responsible for their own insurance status,
and are able to buy private insurance. After living in a socialist regime, they only
adapt over time to the capitalist institutions of the unified Germany. The goal of this
paper is to isolate this effect, while controlling for the others.
In particular, I show that the uptake rates of additional private insurance after the re-
forms are consistent with a model in which agents optimize their individual insurance
status only if they are aware of the organizational form of the health care system (or
more generally the welfare state). East Germans 'are initially less likely to have the
correct beliefs, but learn over time that institutions have changed and they are now
responsible for optimizing their insurance coverage. Moreover, I show that older East
Germans, i.e. those who have lived with the socialist institutions longer, are even
less likely to have correct beliefs than their younger equivalents. Thus, this study
provides evidence for a transition period in people's adaptation to new institutions.
Related Literature
Since the fall of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the interest in what
determines the speed and success of the transition process has been strong. Two
decades after the transition started, varying experiences of the reforming economies
inspire a growing literature to highlight the impact of institutions on the transition
path. Murrell (2008) provides an overview. Investigations on how institutions de-
velop in economies following major political change have considered many factors
that might determine the success of the transition, for example international assis-
tance (Cochrane (2007)). Yet, little notice has been taken of how people's reaction
influences this process. Arguably, the success and speed of transition hinge critically
on how well the people living in transition economies are able to adapt to institutional
change. This paper aims at providing evidence for the existence of a substantial tran-
sition period in this adaptation process.
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Only a few studies have analyzed behavioral differences between former East and
West Germans. Bucher-Koenen and Lusardi (2011) report that in 2009, financial
literacy was lower among people living in the eastern states of Germany, a fact that
they interpret as former citizens of the GDR having not yet caught up to West Ger-
mans in terms of financial education. The authors then link financial literacy to
retirement planning decisions. Sauter (2009) analyzes participation rates in security
markets among East Germans. He finds habit persistence to be a strong explanatory
factor for the low participation. Fuchs-Schiindeln (2008) focuses on the differen-
tial savings behavior of East and West Germans after reunification and finds that
they are consistent with a life-cycle consumption model with precautionary savings.
Differential behavior could also stem from differences in preferences. Alesina and
Fuchs-Schiindeln (2007) analyze the effect of Communism on an individual's taste for
public social policy. They find that former East Germans are more likely to favor a
high state responsibility, pointing to a possible feedback effect of political regimes on
policy preferences. From a different perspective, sociologists have developed a, litera-
ture on social capital formation in the transition economies of Eastern Europe. The
emphasis here has been on the establishment of informal networks, and the formation
of trust after the centrally planned and controlled systems broke down (see Keefer
and Knack (2005) for a survey).
The strategic management literature has explored how firms adapt to a new market-
oriented economy. Apart from the challenges of privatization (Uhlenbruck and de Cas-
tro (2000)), and organizational restructuring (Filatotchev et al. (2000)), also a learn-
ing process has been documented: Kriauciunas and Kale (2006) find that while the
so-called imprinting effect of the socialist environment adversely affects firms' ability
to change their operating knowledge, firms that search for new knowledge from distant
sources (i.e. non-socialist countries) are able to successfully change their knowledge
to meet the demands of the new market-oriented economy. Murrell (2005) presents
related literature., Djankov and Murrell (2002) survey empirical evidence.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides an insti-
tutional background about the German health insurance system before and after
1990. Section 3.3 outlines a simple model of exogenous learning to frame the subse-
quent data analysis. In Section 3.4 I describe the data set used; section 3.5 reports
the results of the empirical analysis. Specific emphasis is placed on differences across
age groups (section 3.5.1), risk taking and risk aversion (section 3.5.2) as well as the
role of preferences for a bigger welfare state (section 3.5.3). Last, I analyze potential
regional aggregate effects (section 3.5.4). Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Health Insurance in Germany
Public health insurance has a long tradition in Germany. Introduced in 1883, and
initially for workers of certain industries only (miners, guilds, factory workers), it
represents one of the first national social insurance systems in the world. In the
following decades, public health insurance coverage was gradually extended to cover
larger parts of the population (10% in 1885, 51% in 1925). Its core elements of be-
ing mandatory, pay-as-you-go, financed by both employers and employees, and being
managed by so-called sickness funds persist to date (Busse and Riesberg (2004)).
After the country's political separation that followed the end of World War II, along
with the divergent political systems, the health care system developed quite differ-
ently in the two new states. In the FRG, the national health insurance system was
continued in a market-based format in which health insurance was mandatory but
could be obtained through the public system or from private insurers. Public health
insurance was the overall dominant form, with 83% of the population being covered
by 1960 and 88% by 1987. Financing was organized through equal contributions from
employers and employees (6% of income in 1950: 12.6% in 1987). Co-payments for
benefits were only nominal (WHO (2000)). Publicly insured individuals could also
purchase complementary private coverage for select cases, but only a very small frac-
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tion of the population actually dida. Only for state employees and self-employed,
often wealthier, individuals private insurance was required.
In the GDR, the social insurance was maintained in principle with a health insurance
system that was universally mandatory. Nearly 100% coverage rate was provided by
only two large managing bodies ("sickness funds"): One for employees, workers, and
their families (covering 89% of population), and one for professionals, members of
agricultural cooperatives, artists and self-employed and their families (covering 11%
of population). De facto, however, the importance of the social insurance system
was only very limited as the majority of health care providers and facilities were state
employed and owned, so that health care was free of cost to citizens and supplemental
health insurance was not needed (Busse and Riesberg (2004)).
With the German reunification, the GDR introduced the health insurance law and
system of the FRG (Article 21, Unification Treaty (1990)), integrating 17 million
former East German citizens into the existing system of the FRG. Health insurance
continued to be mandatory in the unified Germany, with public health insurance be-
ing the predominant form of provision4. The extensive benefits of the public health
insurance included coverage of almost all health care as well as benefit payments to
compensate for salary loss during recovery 5.
3 According to the Association of Private Health Insurers, less than 3% of people had any sort of
private health insurance contract. including travel insurance.
488% of the German population was covered under the public health insurance system in 1997 and
in 2003. 10% of the population were covered by private health insurance, including nearly 4% civil
servants with free governmental care and complementary private insurance. 2% of the population
were covered by other governmental plans (e.g. military, social welfare) and another 0.2% (mainly
self-employed) have no prepaid coverage for health care. Individuals who buy full, i.e. not only
complementary, private health insurance opt out of public health insurance system and its financing
(WHO (2000)).
5Coverage benefits are described in the Social Code Book V. and generally include prevention of
disease and health promotion at the workplace. screening for disease, treatment of disease (including
inpatient and outpatient care, dental care, medication. medical devices, rehabilitation, etc.). and
emergency care. Benefit payments are managed by sickness funds. paying their employed insured
individuals 70% of the last gross salary (max. 90% of net salary) for from week 7 up to week 78
of certified illness, while employers continue to pay 100% of the salary during the first 6 weeks of
sickness (WHO (2000)).
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3.2.1 Health Care Reforms
Even before 1990, both health care systems had suffered from financial problems. In
the GDR, severe under-financing, personnel shortages, and lack of modern medical
equipment and supplies led to the erosion of quality of care in the 1970s and 80s.
Public health indicators fell behind Western standards, e.g. regarding infant mortal-
ity and life expectancy, so that in 1989 a national health conference decided extensive
health care reform - but with the fall of the Berlin Wall the GDR ceased to exist
that year. In the FRG, an era of cost-containment had already started in 1977 with
the introduction of the Health Insurance Cost-Containment Act to ensure stability in
contribution rates, and aimed at increasing technical and allocative efficiency (Busse
and Riesberg (2004)).
After the health insurance system of the FRG was implemented in the former GDR,
aggravating demographic trends, price increases in medical supplies, increasing wages,
and a trend of high income individuals to opt for private insurance further increased
the cost pressure on the public health insurance system. As a result, a long series
of reforms set in. While initially focused on cost-containment through increased effi-
ciency, measures shifted towards cutting benefits, and increasing co-payments as well
as contribution rates in the mid 1990s. Three reform acts in 1997 increased the co-
payments for medication, hospital stays, and dentures. The reimbursement for glasses
were eliminated, and allowances for preventive and rehabilitative care substantially
decreased. From 1998 to 2000, under a new government, some of these measures were
revoked, but re-introduced and expanded in smaller reforms in 2002 and 2003, and
in the Public Health Insurance Modernization Act of 2004 (Steffen (2011)).
As a result, an increasing number of publicly insured individuals sought comple-
mentary private health insurance for benefits previously covered by the public health
insurance. While in 1990 less than 3% had additional private health insurance, this
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number rose to 9.3% in 20026. According to the Association of Private Health Insurers
(2004), the most commonly bought private insurance policies cover dental benefits,
specialty medication, procedures by chief physicians, and hospital accommodation in
private rooms. However, the trend towards additional coverage is not uniform across
the German population. This paper documents that former East Germans are less
likely to sign a complementary health insurance contract than West Germans.
3.3 A Simple Model With Exogenous Learning
Suppose an economy is populated by a continuum of agents who potentially differ
along many dimensions. Let xot denote a vector of individual characteristics that
contains all information about agent i's socio-economic situation in period t, his risk
preferences, as well as any other attributes that may influence his choice of insuring
against health risks. The government of this economy influences an agent's insurance
status through public provision of health insurance, financed by taxes. Thus, the
public health insurance system is part of a solidarily financed welfare state. I denote
the government's choice of public health insurance contracts in period t with Gt.
The private market offers a set of insurance contracts llt that complement public
health insurance. I assume that private insurers do not offer an actuarially fair con-
tract for each individual agent, so that some agents in the population are better off
not signing any complementary health insurance. Various kinds of market restric-
tions or imperfections may cause this incompleteness. For example, insurers might
not be allowed to discriminate along all possible dimensions, even if the relevant char-
acteristics of an agent are verifiable. In Germany, private health insurance carriers
are not allowed to discriminate individuals based on their origin (e.g. former East
vs. former West), and are also prohibited from extensive health screenings (e.g. for
6 Estimates by the Association of Private Health Insurers (2004). The official German micro census
does not make it mandatory to answer questions about private insurance contracts. Private insurers
do publish summary statistics of the number of insurance contracts signed. However, these are an
overestimate of people with additional health insurance, since they include double counting of people
with more than one contract and also include e.g. private travel health insurance contracts.
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cancer) before approving applicants to private health insurance (Busse and Riesberg
(2004)). Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) discuss Akerlof's 1970 incomplete contracts
setting in an insurance framework. When principals are constrained to offer only one
insurance contract to a heterogeneous group of agents, some low risk agents might
prefer not to be insured over pooling in an insurance contract where they subsidize
higher risk types.
3.3.1 Heterogeneous Beliefs about Institutions
Agents have heterogeneous beliefs about the institutional goal of public health insur-
ance. Some agents correctly believe that the scope of the welfare state reflects political
and aggregate economic constraints. They are aware that the specific coverage under
the public health insurance might not necessarily be enough for them individually.
Other agents wrongly believe that the welfare state is all-encompassing and health
related costs are completely nationalized as under a socialist regime. These agents
think that public health insurance provides the necessary coverage for all agents and
that there is no need for them to consider complementing their individual health in-
surance with a private policy.
Let b,t E {0, 1} denote agent Z's belief in period t. In period t = 0 a fraction a
of the population has the wrong belief (bi, 0 = 0) about the scope of the welfare state.
Every period a fraction x of the population learns the true type of the government.
This exogenous learning shock is idiosyncratic and independent of agents' individual
characteristics xij and beliefs bij. If an agent with the correct belief bi, = 1 receives
the shock, nothing changes. An agent with the wrong belief, however, changes his
views and thus possibly his behavior, now realizing that he should optimize his in-
surance status by himself.
Agents can perfectly observe Gt and If. They choose to sign a contract in the
private insurance market if it maximizes their expected utility, given their beliefs.
Let yj E {0, 1} denote agent i's decision to sign a complementary health insurance
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contract with a private insurer. Then
yj,t 1 if wi,t = bit * yt, > 0 (3.1)
bi,E {0, 11 (3.2)
E [U(y, 1 = 1)1 L,, Gt, It) - E [U(yjt = 0)1 xi,t, Gt, le] (3.3)
3.3.2 Comparing Two Populations
The purpose of this paper is to compare two populations, former East and West Ger-
mans (denoted with superscript j = E, W respectively). They now live in the same
economy and share the government as well as the private insurance market, so that
Gt and IlI are the same for both populations. The two populations possibly differ in
demographic make up. Most importantly, however, different shares of these popula-
tions initially have the wrong beliefs about the welfare state. In particular, I assume
that among the former East Germans the wrong beliefs are initially more prevalent,
F IVi.e. a >
From an aggregate point of view, a fraction Yt/ of agents in each population signs
a complementary health insurance contract. Given Gt and lIt, these aggregate insur-
ance levels depend on the agents' beliefs as well as the demographic characteristics
of the respective population:
t-1
Y/ = Y/* * (1 - a& + aix 3(1 - x)") (3.4)
n=0
Since the populations of former East and West Germans potentially have different
demographic characteristics, there is no reason to believe that yE _yV in any pe-
riod. The optimal levels Y/*, however, are unobservable, so that observed differences
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in the actual aggregate levels of complementary health insurance Y/ do not allow
conclusions about differences in beliefs.
The probability for any individual agent to take up complementary health insurance
is
Pr(yi,t = 1) = Pr(bi1 = 1) * Pr(y*t > 0) (3.5)
Being East or West German only influences the probability of having the right beliefs
about the welfare state. By setup, the probability of getting insurance once the
agent realizes he has to optimize, is independent from him being a member of either
population. Thus, a regression with individual level data, that includes a, dummy
for being East German, as well as controls for individual characteristics zi,, yields a
coefficient
,B = Pr(yit = 11 xi., East) - Pr(yi, = 1 I j, West) (3.6)
Since only the decision for or against additional insurance, yi,, is observable, and
the latent variable y7t is not, BE is only identified off individuals who would sign an
insurance if they had the right beliefs, i.e.
iPr(y, 1| y* > 0, East) - Pr(yi, = 1 y<t > 0, West) (3.7)
= Pr(bi, 1| East) - Pr(bi,t = 1|West) (3.8)
t-I
= (a - a)(1 - x > (1 - x)") (3.9)
n=O
Since aw < a, and 0 < x < 1:
/ < 0 and #tf < #3 Vt (3.10)
East Germans in this model are less likely to buy additional health insurance at any
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point in time because of their lower probability to have the correct beliefs. However,
as they learn over time, this effect decreases, and converges zero. This simple model is
intended to frame the following data analysis. While it cannot be concluded that this
particular structure is the true underlying process, the data does provide evidence for
the presence of a learning or adaptation process.
3.4 Data
I use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP (2007)). Since 1984, the
German Institute of Economic Research "DIW" conducts a yearly survey of house-
holds and their members. representative of the population in the FRG. Since 1990,
the study also represents the population in the "new" German states, the regions
formerly belonging to the GDR. The GSOEP survey mainly covers basic information
on population demographics, education, training, and qualification, labor market and
occupational dynamics, earnings, income and social security, health and household
production. Moreover, the survey has an emphasis on aspects of basic political orien-
tation, preferences, values and satisfaction in life (Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005)).
The original sample of the panel included only West-Germans. After 1990, a sample
representative of the former GDR was added. In 2002, the sample was supplemented
by a high-income group, so that since then the survey is representative of the German
population without a truncation on income. The sample used in this paper includes
only participants who were born in either part of Germany before reunification in
1990. Moreover, I restrict attention to people covered under the public health insur-
ance system. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the respondent
has signed a complementary health insurance contract with a private insurer. This
information is only available starting in 1995 up to 2005. The so restricted data
set leaves a total of 126,346 observations for the analysis out of which 43,513 are
responses of former East Germans, and 82,833 of former West Germans.
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Figure 3-1 reports the fractions of East and West Germans with complementary
Figure 3-1: Population Shares with Complementary Health Insurance
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This figure shows the shares of former East (dashed) and West (continuous) Ger-
mans in the sample who had a complementary health insurance contract in the
respective year.
health insurance in the sample. Notice that the population shares with additional
health insurance do not seem to converge over time. However, recall that the model
only predicts aggregate convergence conditional on all characteristics of the popula-
tion. The two German populations, though., are very different. The age structure
differs between East and West Germans: East Germans are younger on average.
Birth rates in East Germany were much higher than in West Germany. In 1980, the
average number of births per woman was 1.9 in the GDR, but only 1.3 in the FRG
(P6tzsch (2007)). Moreover, health care was worse in East Germany, resulting in
lower life-expectancy, and so contributing to a younger population (Busse and Ries-
berg (2004)). An even more striking difference exists in terms of income. At the
beginning of the sample, in 1995, former East Germans on average have 23% less in-
come than West Germans. More importantly, this gap widens over time, and is 35%
in 2005. Fuchs-Schiindeln et al. (2010) have recently documented this divergence.
There is also a difference in home ownership, which can be interpreted as a proxy
for wealth: 31% (25%) less East Germans than West Germans own a home in 1995
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(2005). Among East Germans, despite the age structure, both unemployment and
retirement rates are higher - a trend that increased over time as well7 . Given these
differences, it is to be expected that the population share with additional insurance is
higher (and possibly increasing much faster) among West Germans than among East
Germans. On the other hand, East Germans are slightly more likely to have a high
school and college degree, a factor that might work in the opposite direction. Yet, the
education under the socialist regime likely did not increase knowledge about financial
planning and private insurance. Moreover, the model implies that a reform shock has
a stronger impact on the number of private insurance contracts the more people are
actually optimizing (i.e. have the right beliefs). After the first health care reform in
1997, the increase in additional coverage is much stronger among the West Germans
than East Germans. Following later reforms, the trends are much more equal (and in
the last 5 years of the they are almost exactly the same). This pattern is consistent
with the two populations converging to the same fraction of people with the correct,
beliefs over time. While these factors might explain why the insurance uptake rates
have not converged, it is impossible to conclude from the aggregate numbers whether
the proposed learning mechanism is at work. The remainder of the paper is thus
concerned with an individual level analysis.
The main explanatory variables in the analysis are a dummy that takes on the value
one if the respondent lived in East Germany before reunification, and interactions of
the East dummy with year dummies. These variables capture the effect of being East
German on the probability that the individual has complementary health insurance
separately for each year the survey was taken, and so allow conclusions about the
effect of being used to a different welfare state, and how it evolves over time. To
control for each individual's socio-economic situation, I use three sets of controls in
all regressions. The first set contains relevant socio-demographic information on age,
'In 1995 (2005). the unemployment rate was 8.1% (9.9%) in the West German states but 13.9%
(18.7%) in the former East German territories (Statistik der Bundesagentur far Arbeit (2011)).
After reunification, the German government promoted early retirement by not cutting retirement
benefits too much. which led to a higher retirement rate among East Germans.
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marital status, the individual's perceived health status, as well as his satisfaction
with health. The second set includes information about the level of education and
the current employment status of the respondent. The third set of controls covers in-
come and wealth data: gross and net income as well as asset income on the household
level, and a dummy variable for homeownership. Table 3.10 in the appendix reports
summary statistics for all variables.
The GSOEP study periodically covers special topics: In 1996 and 2001, respon-
dents were asked about their preferences regarding the scope of the welfare state. In
particular, it was asked: "Who should be responsible for financial security in case of
illness?" I generate a dummy variable indicating that the answer was "only the state"
or "mostly the state", as opposed to "both the state and private forces", "mostly pri-
vate forces", or "only private forces". In 2003, questions about risk taking behavior
and risk aversion were included in the study. Respondents were asked to indicate on
a scale from 0 to 10 how willing they were to take risks. Moreover, people were asked
to indicate how much of a hypothetical lottery win they would be prepared to invest
in a financially risky, yet lucrative investment. I use these special topic controls in
sections 3.5.2 and 3.5.3.
3.5 Results
Table 3.1 reports the results from the baseline probit regression 8 . It includes the East
dummy and the three sets of basic controls. The dependent variable is an indicator
for whether the respondent has signed a complementary health insurance contract
in the private market. As a robustness check, I also estimate the linear probability
model (see table 3.11 in the appendix). While the OLS coefficients confirm the general
results, naturally the size of the coefficients is very different in these two regressions.
8All tables report total coefficients. Most interpretations rest on the sign or relative size of coefficients.
Marginal effects are only reported in the text, whenever the absolute size of an effect is of interest.
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Table 3.1: Basic Regression
Dependent Variable:
Complementary Coefficients Coefficients
Health Insurancet (Standard Errors) (Standard Errors)
Eastt
Age
Age squared *10-3
Age cubed *10-
Femalet
\Iarriedi
Married but separated t
Divorced
Widowed t
Health status
Satisfaction with health
Constant
Observations
Log likelihood
-0.517***
(0.008)
-0.022*
(0.010)
0.591
(0.338)
-0.399
(0.259)
0.116***
(0.033)
-0.083
(0.052)
0.231
(0.139)
0.070
(0.038)
-0.148***
(0.023)
-0.012***
(0.002)
0.005
(0.004)
-4.473***
(0.234)
126,346
-41.341
High school degreet
Vocational training t
Completed college degreet
Full or part time employedt
Unemployedt
Retiredt
Log (household income)
Log (household net income)
Log (household asset income)
Homeownert
Probit regression. Omitted categories are male. single. intermediate schooling, not employed.
The variable "Health status" ranges from 1 (very good) to 5 (bad). The variable "Health satis-
faction" ranges from 0 (low) to 10 (high). Standard errors are clustered by East.
Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. f Dummy variable.
The most important explanatory variable is the East dummy. An East German
respondent is significantly less likely to purchase complementary health insurance in
the private market. To establish a learning effect, however, one needs to analyze how
the effect of being from East Germany changes over time. Consider table 3.2, which
reports the results of the same basic regression, with the set of explanatory variables
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0.334***
(0.051)
0.197***
(0.059)
0.239*
(0.119)
0.071*
(0.036)
-0.076
(0.050)
-0.019***
(0.003)
0.041***
(0.007)
0.244***
(0.017)
0.055***
(0.006)
0.034***
(0.007)
expanded by year dummies and East-year interactions. While the coefficient on East
in table 3.1 measured the average effect of being East German over all eleven years
included in the sample, it now corresponds to the same effect specifically in 1995. As
in the basic regression, in 1995, East Germans were significantly less likely to buy
additional health insurance. However, this effect vanishes over time. The coefficients
on all East-year interactions are positive and significant. Thus, in every year, the
East effect is less strong than in 1995. Table 3.3 reports the results of the one-sided
hypothesis tests that the coefficients on the East-year interactions are indeed increas-
ing over time. Except for 1999, 2001, and 2005, the East effect did shrink significantly
in every year. Even for the three years it did not, the decrease was small. In any
given year, the effect of having lived in the GDR on the probability to sign a com-
plementary health insurance contract is the sum of the coefficients on East and the
respective East-year interaction. It increases from -0.978 in 1995 to -0.434 in 2005,
a fifty percent reduction within the eleven years of the sample.
The coefficients in table 3.2 measure the increase in the probability of signing a
private insurance contract since the base year 1995. Recall from equation (3.5) that
according to the learning model introduced, this probability is determined by two in-
dependent effects: It stems both from the change in the latent variable y., influenced
by policy reforms. and the learning effect. The coefficients on the year duinnues doc-
ument that the likelihood for West Germans to buy additional health insurance also
increases every year, starting in 1998, after the first big health care reform. However,
notice that in each year, the east-year interaction coefficient is larger than the one
on the year dummy. The probability of buying additional health insurance increases
faster among East Germans than among West Germans. This is in line with the pre-
dictions of the model: While the change due to reforms is the same for all Germans,
the learning effect is stronger for East Germans, simply because they started with
a larger fraction of people with the wrong beliefs (aE > a'V). While these results
are evidence for a stronger learning effect among East Germans, one cannot conclude
much about the speed of convergence. Reforms to the public health insurance system
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Table 3.2: Basic Regression with East-Year Interactions
Dependent Variable:
Complementary Coefficients Coefficients
Health Insurancet (Standard Errors) (Standard Errors)
Eastt -0.978***
(0.012)
East * 1996t 0.230*** 1996t -0.095***
(0.006) (0.007)
East * 19 9 7 t 0.269*** 19 97 t -0.198***
(0.004) (0.013)
East * 1998t 0.470*** 199 8 t 0.245***
(0.001) (0.001)
East * 1999t 0.403*** 199 9 t 0.271***
(0.008) (0.012)
East * 2000t 0.458*** 2 00 0 t 0.258***
(0.008) (0.014)
East * 2001f 0.444*** 2 00 1f 0.353***
(0.015) (0.023)
East * 2002t 0.460*** 2002t 0.365***
(0.012) (0.026)
East *2003 0.512*** 20 0 3 f 0.406***
(0.014) (0.027)
East * 2004 0.548*** 2 0 0 4 f 0.453***
(0.008) (0.028)
East * 2005f 0.544*** 2005f 0.564***
(0.007) (0.032)
Observations 126.346
Log likelihood -40,414
Probit regression. Omitted categories are 1995. the interaction of East and 1995. male, single,
intermediate schooling, not employed. Standard errors are clstered by East. Table continued
in the appendix (table 3.12).
Significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. t Dummy variable.
change the baseline probability of any individual to seek additional coverage almost
every year since 1997. Only if a" = 0, i.e. all West Germans are assumied to have
the correct beliefs (so that their learning effect is zero), would the difference between
East an West Germans in any given year correspond only to a learning effect among
the former East German population.
The effects of the remaining controls are as expected. Among the socio-demographic
controls shown in the first column of table 3. 1. only the female and widowed duminles
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Table 3.3: Changing East-Year Interactions - Test Statistics
Ho : Test statistic p-value
0> East* 1996 1376.47 0.000
East*1996> East*1997 308.93 0.000
East*1997> East*1998 5690.13 1.87*e- 69
East*1998> East*1999 92.98 1
East*1999> East*2000 1.2*e 5  0.000
East*2000> East*2001 4.54 0.9834
East*2001> East*2002 42.92 2.85*e--"
East*2002>East*2003 2194.76 0
East*2003> East*2004 37.56 4.42*c-10
East*2004> East*2005 19.41 0.9999
This table reports X2 test statistics and p-values for the one-sided hypothesis tests that the
East-year coefficients of the basic regression (table 3.2) are increasing over time.
are significant. Women are significantly more likely to buy additional health insur-
ance. They might face higher health risks, at least for the types of circumstances not
covered under the public health insurance system, or be more risk-averse than men
(Borghans et al. (2009) document such gender differences in risk aversion.). More-
over, the better a respondent perceives his own health, the more likely he is to have
a complementary health insurance9 . The interpretation of this effect is complicated
by a potential endogeneity problem: Health could be positively correlated with risk
aversion, resulting in healthier people to be more likely to buy insurance. However,
the reverse might also be true: People with more coverage could be healthier because
they use the benefits of the insurance and see a doctor more often, or take advantage
of the many preventive measures usually reimbursed and heavily advertised by insur-
ance companies.
9The variable "Health status" ranges from 1 (very good) to 5 (bad).
122
Surprisingly, a respondent's age has only a small and barely significant effect on
his likelihood to buy insurance. Since health risks typically increase with age, this
coefficient should naturally be positive. However, one has to keep in mind that the
age coefficient in this basic regression might capture a variety of effects: Older people
might be more likely to need insurance, but also more prone to the wrong beliefs
about the welfare state, especially if they lived in the GDR. Section 3.5.1 is aimed at
decomposing these effects.
Higher educated respondents are more likely to buy health insurance. They might
be better able to understand their own risk structure or the offers in the private
market. Such an argument has been made for other areas of economic decision mak-
ing. Lusardi and Mitchell (2009), for example, link the level of education obtained
to financial literacy and document a positive causal effect from financial literacy to
retirement planning efforts. All income and wealth variables have positive and signifi-
cant coefficients. One might interpret this result along the same lines as the education
effect: wealthier individuals tend to be more financially literate. It could also be the
case that complementary health insurance is seen as a luxury good. A low-income
individual might for example choose to neither spend any money on artificial denti-
tion, nor on an insurance policy that would cover such costs. All severe health risks
are covered under the public health insurance. Except for being retired, which has
a negative effect on the likelihood to purchase additional insurance, the employment
status of an individual seems to not play a. significant role - the coefficient on full or
part time employed is only significant. at the 10% level.
3.5.1 Age and Cohort Effects
In terms of health risks, age is an important factor. The health care reforms have cut
benefits for artificial dentition and glasses, and so have a particularly strong impact
on older people. Moreover, the nuniber of drugs regularly prescribed on average in-
creases with age, so that a higher co-pay affects the older population more. Given the
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higher risk they face, older people should be more likely to have additional coverage.
Yet, age did not turn out to be a highly significant driving factor in the baseline re-
gression. In this specification, however, age might absorb two opposing effects. While
older people in general might be more likely to buy additional health insurance, they
were also exposed to the respective political regime the longest. It might be the case
that at least among former East Germans older people are more likely to have the
wrong beliefs about the welfare state, and are therefore less likely to buy private in-
surance contracts than their younger countrymen. To disentangle these effects, I run
a regression that includes an East-age interaction, as well as age-year and East-age-
year interactions. To ease the interpretation, I do not include age squared or cubed
as regressors. Table 3.4 reports the results.
Consider the second column of table 3.4. The effect of age among West Germans
in any specific year is measured by the sum of the coefficients on age and the partic-
ular age-year interaction. Notice that for all years this sum is positive. Thus, older
people are indeed more likely to buy insurance. However, this effects gets smaller
over time. The coefficient on every age-year interaction is negative, indicating that
age has less and less impact over time. Considering the reforms to the public health
insurance system, this is only natural: ever decreasing coverage makes it increasingly
necessary also for younger individuals to buy additional insurance, so that the age
gap is shrinking over time.
The striking result of this regression is that among East Germans, older respondents
are actually less likely to buy insurance. The obvious interpretation is that older
East Germans have lived longer under the socialist regime and its all-encompassing
welfare state, so that they are less likely to have the right beliefs than younger East
Germans. This negative effect more than compensates the positive effect of age on the
likelihood to buy additional insurance. The positive coefficients on the East-age-year
interactions confirm this view: Over time, the probability of having the right belief
converges across age groups, and the positive age effect becomes more dominant - a
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Table 3.4: Age Regression
Dependent Variable:
Complementary
health insurancet
East t
East * Age
East * Age * 1996
East * Age * 1997
East * Age * 1998
East * Age * 1999
East * Age * 2000
East * Age * 2001
East * Age * 2002
East * Age * 2003
East * Age * 2004
East * Age * 2005
Observations
Log likelihood
Coefficients
(Standard errors) (Standard errors)
0.0259
(0.023)
-0.026***
(0.001)
-0.008***
(0.0001)
0.007***
(0.0003)
0.011***
(0.0003)
0.008***
(0.0003)
0.006***
(0.0003)
0.006***
(0.0002)
0.006***
(0.0003)
0.010***
(0.0003)
0.010***
(0.0003)
0.0129***
(0.0003)
126,346
-40,139
Age
Age * 1996
Age * 1997
Age * 1998
Age * 1999
Age * 2000
Age * 2001
Age * 2002
Age * 2003
Age * 2004
Age * 2005
0.006***
(0.0002)
0.005***
(0.00003)
0.005***
(0.000002)
-0.003***
(0.00005)
-0.0002***
(0.00002)
-0.002***
(0.000006)
-0.0009***
(0.00004)
-0.001***
(0.0001)
-0.001***
(0.0001)
-0.002***
(0.0001)
-0.003***
(0.0002)
Probit regression. Omitted categories are 1995, the interaction of East and 1995. male, single,intermediate schooling, not employed. Standard errors are clustered by East. Table continued
in the appendix (table 3.13).
Significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. t Dummy variable.
pattern consistent with the exogenous learning model.
To further substantiate the claim that older East Germans are even less likely to
have the right beliefs than younger East Germans, I look at separate regressions for
different groups of cohorts. I divide the sample into 5 groups: those born between
1975 and 1989, those born between 1965 and 1974, those born between 1955 and
1964, those born between 1945 and 1954. and those born before 1945. East Germans
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Coefficients
Table 3.5: Basic Regression For Different Age Groups
Dependent Variable:
Complementary Born Born Born Born Born
Health Insurancet 1975-1989 1965-1974 1955-1964 1945-1954 before 1945
Eastt -0.332*** -0.579*** -0.808*** -1.195*** -1.594***
(0.022) (0.001) (0.016) (0.030) (0.055)
East * 19 9 6t 0.276*** 0.204*** -0.016 0.003
(0.001) (0.007) (0.013) (0.010)
East * 1997t 0.383*** 0.282*** 0.153*** 0.346***
(0.002) (0.019) (0.017) (0.006)
East * 19 9 8t 0.179*** 0.139*** 0.359*** 0.549*** 0.761***
(0.014) (0.004) (0.007) (0.022) (0.014)
East * 1999t 0.117*** 0.159*** 0.338*** 0.561*** 0.537***
(0.016) (0.003) (0.017) (0.024) (0.003)
East * 20 0 0 t 0.272*** 0.212*** 0.334*** 0.590*** 0.508***
(0.012) (0.004) (0.013) (0.023) (0.003)
East * 2001t 0.194*** 0.152*** 0.405*** 0.495*** 0.536***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.023) (0.040) (0.008)
East * 2002t 0.227*** 0.161*** 0.418*** 0.432*** 0.556***
(0.001) (0.009) (0.024) (0.026) (0.006)
East * 2003t 0.091*** 0.299*** 0.501*** 0.567*** 0.584***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.026) (0.031) (0.006)
East * 2004t 0.184*** 0.284*** 0.443*** 0.679*** 0.646***
(0.016) (0.005) (0.016) (0.024) (0.009)
East * 2005t 0.110*** 0.316*** 0.381*** 0.698*** 0.712***
(0.014) (0.00001) (0.022) (0.020) (0.013)
Observations 17,368 22,149 26,882 18,859 41,088
Log likelihood -5,510 -7,784 -9,262 -6,607 -10,476
Probit regression. Omitted categories
interniediate schooling, not employed.
are 1995, the interaction of East and 1995, male, single,
Standard errors are clustered by East. Table continued
in the appendix (table 3.14).
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. t Dummy variable.
in the youngest group have spent only their childhood in a socialist regime. For them,
the effect of being from East Germany should be the least pronounced. In the model,
this corresponds to a smaller share of people with the wrong beliefs, i.e. a smaller
o. However, the change over time should be slower for them. Since I assumed that
the same fraction of the population receives the iid learning shock every period, there
should be convergence in the share of the population with the correct beliefs.
Table 3.5 reports the results of the baseline regressions by age group. Notice that
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for the youngest group, the sample does not include any respondents with comple-
mentary health insurance in 1995, 1996, or 1997 (when they were between 6 and 22
years old)10 . Since the respective East-year interactions for this group were omitted,
the remaining coefficients on the interaction terms do not directly compare to those
of the older age groups. Focusing on the remaining 4 age groups, one can see a clear
pattern consistent with the exogenous learning model: The effect of being from East
Germany in 1995 is stronger the older the respondents are. This corresponds to a
larger share oa of people with the wrong beliefs initially. After the first big reforms
(i.e. starting in 1998), the East effect decreases over time within each age group:
The coefficients on the East-year interactions are positive and increasing from year
to year. This learning effect, however, is stronger for older respondents. Comparing
the interaction coefficients across different age groups for any given year, one can see
the convergence pattern. The coefficients are smaller for younger respondents, older
individuals learn at a faster pace.
3.5.2 Risk Taking and Risk Aversion
Living in an all-encompassing welfare state might influence people's risk taking be-
havior or even their risk-aversion. If East Germans are either less risk averse or
simply take less risks, these differences in behavior or preferences would make them
less likely to buy additional health insurance. To determine whether the differences
in the probability of taking up private health insurance is due to differences in beliefs
or preferences, I include measures of risk aversion and risk taking behavior in the
analysis. In 2003, the survey included the following questions: "How would you rate
your willingness to take risks on a scale from 0 (low) to 10 (high)?" and "What
share of a lottery winning would you be prepared to invest in a financially risky, yet
lucrative investment?"" The answer to the first question serves as a measure for a
1oNloreover. none of the young respondents were widowed or retired during the time of the survey.
"The full question on the survey read: Please consider what you would do in the following situation:
Imagine you had won 100.000 Euros in the lottery. Almost immediately after you collect the win-
nings, you receive the following financial offer from a reputable bank, the conditions of which are
as follows: There is a chance to double the money within two years. It is equally possible that you
could lose half of the amount invested. You have the opportunity to invest the amount, part of the
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Table 3.6: Risk Regression
Dependent Variable:
Complementary Coefficients
health insurancet (Standard errors)
East t  -0.782***
(0.011)
Risk taking 0.03***
(0.002)
East * Risk taking 0.03***
(0.003)
Risk aversion 0.011***
(0.001)
East * Risk aversion 0.037***
(0.002)
Observations 4877
Log likelihood -1.891
Probit regression. Omitted categories are male, single, intermediate schooling, not employed.
Risk taking ranges from 0 (low) to 10 (high). Risk aversion ranges from 1 (low) to 6 (high).
Standard errors are clustered by East. Table continued in the appendix (table 3.17).
Significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%., * significant at 10%. t Dummy variable.
respondent's risk taking behavior, while the second question provides an estimate of
the respondents risk aversion.
First, I analyze whether a respondent's willingness to take risks or his risk aversion
influence his likelihood to buy additional health insurance, and how this differs be-
tween former East and West Germans. Table 3.6 reports the results of the baseline
regression augmented by the risk variables as well as their interactions with the East
dummy. Since this regression only includes observations from one year of the survey,
the coefficients do not directly compare to the basic regression results. Notice how-
ever that the coefficient on the East dunny is still significantly negative. The main
conclusion is not changed: East Germans are significantly less likely to have com-
plementary health insurance, a difference that can be explained by them having the
amount or reject the offer. What share of your lottery winnings would you be prepared to invest
in this financially risky, yet lucrative investment? The answer categories were: 100,000 Euros (1),
80,000 Euros (2), 60,000 Euros (3). 40,000 Euros (4). 20,000 Euros (5). or "Nothing. I would decline
the offer" (6).
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wrong beliefs about the welfare state with a higher probability than West Germans.
The coefficients on risk taking and risk aversion are as expected: The more willing a
respondent is to take risks, the more likely he is to buy additional insurance. Most
likely, insurance contracts can not control for these attitudes towards risk taking, so
that this effect could be evidence for adverse selection or moral hazard. Naturally,
the more risk averse a respondent reports he is, the more likely he is to have insur-
ance. Interestingly, these effects are very similar for East and West Germans. For
risk taking, the coefficients are almost exactly the same, while risk aversion is a little
bit more influential among East Germans than it is among West Germans.
Second, I ask whether risk taking behavior or risk aversion is determined in part
by which regime the respondent lived under before reunification. If that was the case,
then the results in table 3.6 would have to be questioned. Consider table 3.7. It
reports the results of ordinary least square regressions of the risk variables on the
East dummy and the baseline controls (the full results are reported in the appendix).
Former East Germans seem a little more willing to take risks than West Germans.
If anything, this should make them more likely to buy additional insurance, but the
effect is only significant at the 10% level. For risk aversion, the East dummy is not
significant at all. These results make it safe to reject the hypothesis that the dif-
ferences in the probability to take up complementary health insurance between East
and West Germans is due to differences in risk taking behavior or risk aversion.
3.5.3 Preferences For a Larger Welfare State
Alesina and Fuchs-Schiindeln (2007) use the same data set employed in this paper
to document that living under a. socialist regime influences preferences about public
social policies. They show that former East Germans are more likely to prefer the
state to be responsible for providing social services, insurance, and redistribution.
Observing former East Germans to be less likely to seek additional insurance beyond
the coverage of the public health insurance could be a consequence of or at least cor-
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Table 3.7: Risk Regression
Dependent Variable: Risk taking Risk aversion
Eastt 0.121* 0.245
(0.009) (0.023)
Observations 4960 4962
R. squared 0.0397 0.0914
Omitted categories are male, single, intermediate schooling, not employed. Standard errors are
clustered by East. Risk taking ranges from 0 (low) to 10 (high). Risk aversion ranges from 1
(low) to 6 (high).Table continued in the appendix (table 3.17).
Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. f Dummy variable.
related with them having a stronger preference for state intervention. If, for example,
an agent thinks that the contracts offered in the private market are unfair, he might
have a, stronger preference for the state to intervene and be less likely to buy private
insurance.
To investigate this potential relationship, I include the same measure of preferences
for a bigger welfare state that Alesina and Fuchs-Schiindeln (2007) used in their anal-
ysis. In the surveys of 1996 and 2001, it was asked: "Who should be responsible for
financial security in case of illness?" I generate a dummy variable indicating that the
answer was "only the state" or "mostly the state", as opposed to "both the state
and private forces", "mostly private forces", or "only private forces", and include it
in the baseline regression. Table 3.8 reports the results. Again, since this regression
only includes two of the years included in the baseline sample, the size of the coeffi-
cients is not necessarily comparable. Again, however, the effect of having lived under
the socialist regime on the likelihood to complement insurance coverage with a pri-
vate contract remains significantly negative. Even controlling for preferences about
the welfare state, former East Germans are less likely to buy private health insurance.
Interestingly, the effect of the preferences for state responsibilities are quite different
among former East and West Germans. While a stronger preference for state inter-
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Table 3.8: Preference Regression
Dependent Variable:
Complementary Coefficients
health insurancet (Standard errors)
Eastt -0.727***
(0.001)
Preferencet -0.208***
(0.020)
East * Preferencet 0.024
(0.039)
Observations 21,836
Log likelihood -6,180
Probit regression. Preference is a variable that contains the answer to the question of
who should be responsible for the financial security in case of illness. It takes on the value
1 if the answer was "only the state" or "mostly the state", and 0 for "both state and
private forces", "mostly private forces", or "only private forces". Omitted categories
are 1996, the interaction of East and 1996, male, single, intermediate schooling, not
employed. Standard errors are clustered by East. Table continued in the appendix
(table 3.16).
*** Significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. t Dummy variable.
vention makes respondents significantly less likely to purchase additional insurance
among West Germans, there is no significant effect among the former East German
population.
3.5.4 Aggregate Effects: Regional Differences
An agent's decision to obtain additional insurance coverage might be influenced by
factors not captured as an individual characteristic, but rather inherent in his envi-
ronment. Living in a big city, for example, might make it much easier to access the
private insurance market. Insurance agencies are probably rare to find in more rural
areas. Health services might be cheaper in some areas, which could make agents living
there less likely to have a complementary health insurance. In short, the aggregate
economic and demographic situation of the region an agent lives in might greatly
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influence his likelihood to obtain additional insurance coverage in the private market.
If former East Germans mostly live in areas that have a negative impact on the in-
surance decision, the observed differences might not be attributable to differences in
beliefs.
The GSOEP data set does allow me to identify in which state the respondent lived
in each year of the survey". I include dummies for all states as well as East-state
interactions. The omitted category is the state Hamburg. Since 1991, Hamburg has
consistently had the largest GDP per capita (Statistisches Bundesamt (2010)). It is
also a city state with a dense population and urban infrastructure. The coefficients
measure the difference between Hamburg and the respective state. Table 3.9 reports
the results.
Consider first the coefficient on the East dummy. In Hamburg, former East Ger-
mans are significantly less likely to have additional health insurance than their fellow
West German citizens. All coefficients on the East-state interactions are negative,.
while all coefficients on the state dummies are positive (with the exception of Berlin,
where the East interaction is not significant, and the state dummy is negative). Two
things follow from this. First, in every state, forimer East Germans are less likely to
have complementary health insurance, confirming the results of the basic regression.
Second, not surprisingly, where a respondent lives does have a significant effect on
him purchasing insurance, since almost all coefficients are significant. Interestingly,
though, this effect is opposite for former East and West Germans. While West Ger-
mans in almost all states are more likely to buy additional insurance than those living
in Hamburg, for East Germans the opposite is true. This means that in every state,
the effect of being East German is stronger than in among people living in Hamburg.
One possible explanation could be that East Germans who migrated to Hamburg (an
international harbor, and home to the headquarters of many large comipanies) are
1 2The dataset does not distinguish the states Rheinland-Pfalz and Saarland. Thus. there are only 15
states to control for. even though Germany has 16 LUnder.
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Table 3.9: Regression with State Controls
Dependent Variable:
Complementary
health insurancet
Eastf
East * Schleswig-Holstein t
East * Niedersachsent
East * Brement
East * Nordrhein-Westfalent
East * Hessent
East * Rheinland-Pfalz, Saarlandt
East * Baden-Wiirtembergt
East * Bayern t
East * Berlin t
East * Mecklenburig-Vorpoimimernt
East * Brandenburgi
East * Sachsen-Anhaltt
East * Thfiringent
East * Sachsent
Observations
Log likelihood
Coefficients
(Standard errors)
Probit regression. Omitted categories are Hamburg, the interaction of East and Hamburg, 1995,
the interaction of East and 1995, male, single, intermediate schooling, not employed. Standard
errors are clustered by East. Table continued in the appendix (table 3.18).
Significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. t Dummy variable.
especially likely to have the correct beliefs about the welfare state. Either a selection
effect (more pro-capitalism people moved to Hamburg) or a treatment effect (the en-
vironment made them learn faster) could be responsible for such a difference in the
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Coefficients
(Standard errors)
-0.501***
(0.0478)
-0.758***
(0.033)
-0.176***
(0.021)
-0.163**
(0.061)
-0.653***
(0.037)
-0.485***
(0.033)
-0.277***
(0.027)
-0.338***
(0.0145)
-0.378***
(0.023)
0.008
(0.069)
-1.082***
(0.079)
-0.371***
(0.041)
-0.301**
(0.104)
-0.979***
(0.086)
-0.479***
(0.087)
126.331
-40.126
Schleswig-Holsteint
Niedersachsen t
Brement
Nordrhein-Westfalent
Hessent
Rheinland-Pfalz. Saarlandt
Baden-Wiirtembergt
Bayernt
Berlint
M\ecklenbu rg-Vorpoimernt
Brandenburgt
Sachsen-Anhaltt
Thuringent
Sachsent
0.001
(0.009)
0.150***
(0.023)
0.083***
(0.001)
0.353***
(0.018)
0.061***
(0.01)
0.08**
(0.029)
0.271***
(0.023)
0.274***
(0.026)
-0.056***
(0.005)
0.694***
(0.039)
0.124***
(0.019)
-0.019
(0.053)
0.636***
(0.053)
0.286***
(0.047)
average beliefs of East Germans in Hamburg and elsewhere.
3.6 Discussion
This paper analyzes the question whether people adapt to new institutions imme-
diately, or learn only over time how to adjust their economic decisions. Germany
presents a unique opportunity to study this question. Since at reunification the well-
established economic and political system of West Germany was imposed onto East
Germany, any observed adaptation process is rather due to people learning than to
institutions developing. Moreover, former West Germans can serve as a meaningful
control group. To identify a learning process among former East Germans, I analyze
the economic decision of buying private health insurance.
In the spirit of a "reverse" difference-in-difference approach, where the treatment
(socialism) occurred in the pre-period, and the shock (health care reform) is the same
for treatment and control group, I study the differential reaction of former East and
'West Germans to a series of health care reforms that started in 1997. Along with
the gradual decrease in coverage under the public health insurance system, former
East Germans were significantly less likely to sign complementary health insurance
contracts in the private market. I show that this difference can be interpreted as East
Germans having not yet fully adapted to the new capitalist institutions. In partic-
ular, I show that the uptake rates of additional private insurance after the reforms
are consistent with a model in which agents learn about institutions through an ex-
ogenous shock and optimize their individual insurance status only if they are aware
of the organizational form of the health care system (or more generally the welfare
state). East Germans are initially less likely to have the correct beliefs, but learn over
time how institutions have changed and that they are now responsible for optimizing
their insurance coverage.
An age decomposition of the regression analysis substantiated the convergence hy-
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pothesis of the learning model. The effect of being from the East is more pronounced
but vanishes faster among older Germans. This is consistent with older East Germans,
who lived under the socialist regime longer, being less likely to have the correct beliefs
about the welfare state initially, but receiving an exogenous learning shock with the
same probability as their younger equivalents. The purpose of this exercise is not to
claim that the simple exogenous learning model is the true underlying process of East
Germans adapting to capitalism; most likely, the true learning process is more com-
plex. Rather, this study provides evidence for the existence of a substantial transition
period in people's adaptation to new institutions. Taking into account that people
need time to adjust is critical for predicting the success and speed of an economy's
transition from socialism to capitalism.
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Table 3.10: Summary Statistics
Total West East
Variable Mean Mean Mean
(Standard deviation) (Standard deviation) (Standard deviation)
Eastt
Age
Femalet
Marriedt
Married but separatedt
Divorcedf
Widowedt
Health status
Satisfaction with health
High school degreef
Vocational training f
Completed college degreet
Full or part time employedt
Unemployedt
Retiredt
Household income
Household net income
Household asset income
Homneownert
Observations
0.344
(0.475)
46.352
(17.523)
0.538
(0.499)
0.626
(0.484)
0.013
(0.111)
0.054
(0.226)
0.071
(0.257)
2.619
(0.935)
6.608
(2.192)
0.158
(0.365)
0.702
(0.458)
0.158
(0.364)
0.499
(0.500)
0.089
(0.285)
0.261
(0.439)
38506.300
(38610.730)
33754.600
(23946.050)
2137.444
(12949.270)
0.516
(0.500)
126.346
46.793
(17.578)
0.541
(0.498)
0.634
(0.482)
0.012
(0.111)
0.050
(0.219)
0.074
(0.262)
2.607
(0.949)
6.717
(2.209)
0.151
(0.359)
0.687
(0.464)
0.118
(0.322)
0.500
(0.500)
0.054
(0.225)
0.257
(0.437)
42824.850
(42331.280)
36341.160
(27128.080)
2806.130
(15771.740)
0.568
(0.495)
82.833
45.512
(17.389)
0.533
(0.499)
0.611
(0.488)
0.013
(0.112)
0.061
(0.238)
0.065
(0.247)
2.640
(0.909)
6.401
(2.146)
0.171
(0.377)
0.729
(0.444)
0.234
(0.423)
0.497
(0.500)
0.156
(0.363)
0.269
(0.444)
30285.340
(28538.540)
28830.710
(15068.640)
864.508
(3301.101)
0.417
(0.493)
43.513
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Summary statistics for the explanatory variables included in all regression. Income variables in
Euro. I Dummy variable.
Table 3.11: Basic Regression - Linear Probability Model
Dependent Variable:
Complementary
Health Insurancet
East t
Age
Age squared *10-3
Age cubed *10-5
Female t
Marriedt
Married but separatedt
Divorcedt
Widowedt
Health status
Satisfaction with health
Constant
Observations
Coefficients
(Standard Errors)
-0.083**
(0.001)
-0.0038
(0.004)
0.109
(0.114)
-0.076
(0.077)
0.02
(0.011)
-0.016
(0.009)
0.049
(0.041)
0.014*
(0.001)
-0.02***
(0.00001)
-0.003
(0.001)
0.001
(0.0002)
-0.539
(0.134)
126.346
Coefficients
(Standard Errors)
High school degreet
Vocational training t
Completed college degreet
Full or part time employedt
Unemployedt
Retiredt
Log (household income)
Log (household net income)
Log (household asset income)
Hloneownert
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0.074
(0.028)
0.031
(0.017)
0.045
(0.044)
0.001
(0.003)
0.056
(0.008)
0.013
(0.004)
0.006
(0.003)
0.013
(0.003)
-0.007
(0.007)
-0.011
(0.003)
OLS regression. Omitted categories are male, single, intermediate schooling, not employed. The
variable "Health status" ranges from 1 (very good) to 5 (bad). The variable "Health satisfaction"
ranges from 0 (low) to 10 (high). Standard errors are clustered by East.
Significant at 1%{. ** significant at 5%,. * significant at 10%. t Dunnny variable.
Table 3.12: Basic Regression with East-Year Interactions - continued from table 3.2
Dependent Variable:
Complementary Coefficients Coefficients
Health Insurancet (Standard Errors) (Standard Errors)
Age -0.028*** High school degreet 0.322***
* -3(0.007) (0.057)Age squared *100650* Vocational trainingt 0.182**
* -5(0.312) (0.058)Age cubed *10-0.430 Completed college degreet  0.253*
Fealet(0.253) 
(0.105)
F aet0.108** Log (household incomne) 0.050***
(0.036) (0.012)
Marriedt -0.030 Log (household net income 0.177***
(0.022) (0.035)
Married but separatedt 0.246 Log (household asset income) 0.059***
(0.134) (0.005)
Divorcedt 0.077 Homeownert 0.011
(0.055) (0.019)
Widowed t  -0.103*** Full or part time employedt 0.084*
(0.002) (0.040)
Health status -0.016*** Unemployedt 
-0.084
(0.002) (0.054)
Satisfaction with health 0.002 Retiredl 0.006
(0.004) (0.010)
Constant 
-4.059***
(0.400)
Observations 126,346
Log likelihood 
-40.414
male, single,Probit regression. Omitted categories are 1995, the interaction of East and 1995,
intermediate schooling, not employed. Standard errors are clustered by East.
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. t Dumny variable.
,Table 3.13: Age Regression - continued from table 3.4
Dependent Variable:
Complementary Coefficients Coefficients
Health Insurance t (Standard Errors) (Standard Errors)
East * 1996t
East * 1997f
East * 1998t
East * 1999t
East * 2000f
East * 20011
East * 2002f
East * 2003f
East * 2004f
East * 2005t
Female t
larried t
Married but separated t
Divorcedt
Widowedi
Health status
Satisfaction with health
High school degree t
Constant
Observations
Log likelihood
0.560***
(0.005)
0.089***
(0.008)
0.083***
(0.008)
0.162***
(0.005)
0.288***
(0.004)
0.281***
(0.002)
0.294***
(0.0005)
0.230***
(0.002)
0.253***
(0.003)
0.140***
(0.003)
0.103**
(0.039)
-0.014***
(0.0001)
0.256*
(0.122)
0.095
(0.075)
-0.125***
(0.024)
-0.017***
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
0.305***
(0.053)
-4.737***
(0.240)
126.346
-40.139
1996f
1997f
1998f
19 9 9t
20 0 0t
20 0 1t
2002f
2003f
2004t
2005ft
Vocational training f
Completed college degreef
Log (household income)
Log (household net income)
Log (household asset income)
Homeowner t
Full or part time employed t
Unemployedt
Retired t
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-0.328***
(0.004)
-0.423***
(0.006)
0.363***
(0.005)
0.272***
(0.005)
0.353***
(0.005)
0.385***
(0.009)
0.416***
(0.008)
0.453***
(0.006)
0.515***
(0.004)
0.692***
(0.0001)
0.191***
(0.041)
0.301***
(0.063)
0.037***
(0.004)
0.200***
(0.012)
0.060***
(0.006)
-0.002
(0.037)
0.077
(0.049)
-0.098*
(0.044)
-0.001
(0.003)
Probit regression. Omitted categories are 1995, the interaction of East and 1995, male, single,
intermediate schooling. not employed. Standard errors are clustered by East.
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. t Durny variable.
Table 3.14: Basic Regression For Different Age Groups - continued from table 3.5
Dependent Variable:
Complementary Born Born Born Born Born
Health Insurancet 1975-1989 1965-1974 1955-1964 1945-1954 before 1945
1996t
1997t
1998f
1999t
2000f
2001f
20 0 2 t
2003f
2004f
20 0 5 t
Age
Age squared *10-3
Age cubed *10-5
Femalet
Married t
Married but separated t
Divorced t
Widowed t
Health status
Satisfaction with health
Observations
Log likelihood
0.517***
(0.015)
0.445***
(0.006)
0.400***
(0.001)
0.565***
(0.008)
0.558***
(0.015)
0.671***
(0.018)
0.671***
(0.022)
0.797***
(0.028)
0.248
(0.306)
-12.58
(13.84)
20.93
(19.70)
0.085**
(0.027)
-0.020
(0.029)
0.197
(0.694)
-0.152
(0.190)
0.041***
(0.0003)
-0.004
(0.004)
17.368
-5,510
0.032
(0.017)
-0.081**
(0.030)
0.534***
(0.041)
0.579***
(0.056)
0.650***
(0.073)
0.751***
(0.089)
0.790***
(0.105)
0.808***
(0.118)
0.921***
(0.134)
1.039***
(0.144)
-0.355*
(0.142)
11.83*
(4.939)
-13.37**
(5.135)
0.086***
(0.021)
0.110***
(0.025)
0.070
(0.056)
0.091
(0.129)
0.606*
(0.306)
0.030***
(0.003)
0.008**
(0.003)
22.149
-7,784
-0.029
(0.019)
-0.140***
(0.034)
0.323***
(0.034)
0.330***
(0.051)
0.379***
(0.056)
0.383***
(0.065)
0.447***
(0.067)
0.449***
(0.069)
0.512***
(0.068)
0.635***
(0.073)
1.413**
(0.449)
-36.05***
(10.53)
30.22***
(8.228)
0.037
(0.093)
-0.079
(0.116)
0.319
(0.294)
-0.004
(0.027)
0.049
(0.205)
-0.010
(0.036)
-0.002
(0.011)
26,882
-9.262
-0.115***
(0.010)
-0.283***
(0.013)
0.096**
(0.031)
0.132***
(0.029)
0.097***
(0.028)
0.254***
(0.014)
0.211***
(0.005)
0.295***
(0.0004)
0.292***
(0.009)
0.424***
(0.019)
-0.809
(0.627)
15.95
(11.53)
-10.38
(6.957)
0.208***
(0.020)
-0.007
(0.004)
0.436***
(0.066)
0.297**
(0.098)
-0.108
(0.060)
0.001
(0.004)
-0.012
(0.014)
18.859
-6.607
-0.069***
(0.009)
-0.172***
(0.013)
0.218***
(0.002)
0.263***
(0.006)
0.193***
(0.011)
0.304***
(0.019)
0.316***
(0.025)
0.377***
(0.026)
0.426***
(0.026)
0.511***
(0.028)
0.145**
(0.052)
-1.757***
(0.526)
0.657***
(0.166)
0. 167*
(0.078)
-0.337***
(0.008)
-0.090***
(0.020)
-0.161***
(0.004)
-0.315***
(0.015)
-0.096***
(0.014)
-0.002
(0.008)
41.088
-10.476
Probit regression. Omitted categories are 1995. the interaction of East and
intermediate schooling, not employed.
1995. male, single,
Standard errors are clustered by East. Table continued
on the next page.
Significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. I Dummy variable.
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Table 3.15: Regression by cohort - continued from table 3.14
Dependent Variable:
Complementary Born Born Born Born Born
Health Insurancet 1975-1989 1965-1974 1955-1964 1945-1954 before 1945
High school degreet 0.306*** 0.217*** 0.252*** 0.449 0.425*
(0.010) (0.011) (0.045) (0.290) (0.167)
Vocational training t 0.124*** 0.017 0.152** 0.124 0.286***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.053) (0.089) (0.076)
Completed college degreet 0.191 0.117 0.153*** 0.298*** 0.476***
(0.127) (0.066) (0.040) (0.063) (0.095)
Log (household income) 0.089*** 0.083 0.022 -0.038*** -0.003
(0.004) (0.046) (0.027) (0.009) (0.010)
Log (household net income) 0.005* -0.00002 0.316*** 0.386*** 0.395***
(0.002) (0.051) (0.031) (0.019) (0.019)
Log (household asset income) 0.047*** 0.054*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.090***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.013) (0.009)
Homeownert -0.030 -0.060 -0.025 0.039 0.121***
(0.063) (0.048) (0.030) (0.047) (0.011)
Full or part time employed t  0.097 0.121*** 0.087* 0.151** -0.007
(0.105) (0.014) (0.036) (0.056) (0.014)
Unemplovedt -0.134 -0.117 -0.130*** -0.158*** -0.018
(0.129) (0.107) (0.025) (0.036) (0.028)
Retiredt -0.276* -0.164*** 0.019 -0.066***
(0.112) (0.032) (0.032) (0.015)
Constant -4.856* 0.355 -23.56*** 8.062 -9.514***
(2.153) (1.272) (6.801) (11.02) (1.578)
Observations 17,368 22,149 26,882 18,859 41,088
Log likelihood -5,510 -7,784 -9,262 -6,607 -10,476
Probit regression. Omitted categories are 1995. the interaction of East and 1995. male, single.
intermediate schooling, not employed. Standard errors are clustered by East.
Significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. t Dummy variable.
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Table 3.16: Preference Regression - continued from table 3.8
Dependent Variable:
Complementary Coefficients Coefficients
Health Insurancet (Standard errors) (Standard errors)
2 00 1t 0.452*** High school degreet 0.364***
(0.013) (0.042)
East * 2 00 1t 0.198*** Vocational trainingt 0.180
(0.009) (0.093)
Age -0.036*** Completed college degreet 0.275
(0.007) (0.149)
Age squared *10-3 0.829*** Log (household income) 0.041*
(0.075) (0.017)
Age cubed *10-5 -0.507** Log (household net income) 0.230***
(0.158) (0.023)
Femalet 0.089*** Log (household asset income) 0.052***
(0.024) (0.011)
MIarried t  0.002 Hoineownert 0.039***
(0.029) (0.003)
Married but separatedt 0.340 Full or part time employedt 0.117
(0.223) (0.109)
Divorcedt 0.097 Unemployedt -0.102
(0.064) (0.088)
Widowedt -0.069 Retired -0.037
(0.080) (0.023)
Health status -0.049*** Constant -4l.391***
(0.006) (0.402)
Satisfaction with health 0.002 Observations 21836
(0.013) Log likelihood -6,180
Probit regression. Preference is a variable that contains the answer to the question of who should
be responsible for the financial security in case of illness. It takes on the value 1 if the answer
was "only the state" or "mostly the state", and 0 for "both state and private forces", "mostly
private forces", or "only private forces". Omitted categories are 1996, the interaction of East
and 1996, male. single, intermediate schooling, not employed. Standard errors are clustered by
East.
Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. f Dummy variable.
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Table 3.17: Risk Regression - continued from tables 3.6 and 3.7
Complementary Risk taking Risk aversion
Dependent Variable: health insurancet
Age
Age squared *10-3
Age cubed *10-
Femalet
Marriedt
Married but separatedt
Divorcedt
Widowedt
Number of kids under 16 in the household
Number of adults in the household
Health status
Satisfaction with health
High school degreet
Vocational trainingt
Completed college degreet
Log (household income)
Log (household net income)
Log (household asset income)
Homeownert
Full or part time employedt
Unemployedt
Retiredt
Constant
Observations
Log likelihood / R squared
0.035
(0.035)
-0.880
(0.964)
0.699
(0.772)
0.068***
(0.007)
0.048
(0.052)
0.548*
(0.255)
0.29*
(0.12)
-0.114*
(0.052)
-0.071*
(0.029)
-0.038
(0.028)
0.069***
(0.019)
0.017*
(0.007)
0.188***
(0.041)
0.16***
(0.026)
0.270***
(0.014)
0.052
(0.068)
0.127
(0.115)
0.084***
(0.004)
-0.111
(0.084)
0.049
(0.043)
-0.251***
(0.002)
-0.279***
(0.048)
-4.282***
(0.026)
4877
-1.891
0.047
(0.012)
-0.898
(0.312)
0.612
(0.204)
0.213
(0.087)
0.161
(0.05)
0.085
(0.06)
0.115
(0.048)
0.123
(0.025)
-0.023
(0.024)
0.068
(0.027)
-0.152
(0.035)
-0.009
(0.02)
-0.076
(0.099)
-0.010
(0.018)
-0.024
(0.070)
-0.025
(0.008)
-0.016
(0.009)
-0.041
(0.038)
0.023
(0.009)
0.021
(0.038)
4.658*
(0.358)
4960
0.0397
-0.187
(0.054)
3.568
(0.899)
-2.335
(0.525)
-0.761*
(0.057)
-0.410
(0.087)
-0.16*
(0.011)
0.25*
(0.01)
-0.212
(0.284)
-0.082
(0.059)
-0.041
(0.035)
0.112
(0.036)
0.091
(0.251)
0.300
(0.188)
-0.016
(0.035)
0.187
(0.090)
-0.023
(0.014)
0.060
(0.075)
0.202
(0.026)
0.160
(0.197)
-0.364
(0.188)
6.745*
(0.381)
4962
0.0914
Probit regression in the first coluni. Omitted categories are male, single. intermediate schooling,
not employed. Risk taking ranges from 0 (la to 10 (high). Risk aversion ranges from I (low)
to 6 (high).Standard errors are clustered by East.
Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. I Dummy variable.
Table 3.18: Regression with State Controls- continued from table 3.9
Dependent Variable:
Complementary Coefficients Coefficients
health insurancet (Standard errors) (Standard errors)
East * 1996f
East * 19971
East * 1998f
East * 1999f
East * 2000t
East *2001
East *2002
East *2003
East *2004
East *2005
Age
Age squared *10-3
Age cubed *10- 5
Fenialet
Marriedt
M\arried but separatedit
Divorcedt
Widowedt
Health status
Satisfaction with health
Observations
Log likelihood
0.232***
(0.006)
0.268***
(0.003)
0.471***
(0.002)
0.403***
(0.009)
0.452***
(0.009)
0.439***
(0.015)
0.454***
(0.013)
0.506***
(0.013)
0.542***
(0.007)
0.539***
(0.007)
-0.029***
(0.007)
0.696*
(0.321)
-0.461
(0.26)
0.109**
(0.037)
-0.029
(0.02)
0.247
(0.142)
0.086
(0.054)
-0.099***
(0.005)
-0.019***
(0.002)
0.001
(0.003)
126,331
-40,126
19971
1998t
1999f
2000t
2001 t
2002f
2003t
2004 f
2005ft
High school degreet
Vocational trainingt
Completed college degreet
Log (household income)
Log (household net income)
Log (household asset income)
Homeownert
Full or part time eniployedt
Unemployedt
Retiredt
Constant
Probit regression. Omitted categories are Hamburg. the interaction of East and Hamburg, 1995.
the interaction of East and 1995, male, single, intermediate schooling, not employed. Standard
errors are clustered by East.
* Significant at 1% significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. f Dummy variable.
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-0.097***
(0.007)
-0.201***
(0.013)
0.246***
(0.002)
0.269***
(0.01)
0.259***
(0.012)
0.354***
(0.022)
0.367***
(0.024)
0.405***
(0.026)
0.455***
(0.026)
0.566***
(0.032)
0.327***
(0.063)
0.184**
(0.058)
0.25*
(0.108)
0.05***
(0.011)
0.173***
(0.034)
0.059***
(0.006)
0.02***
(0.003)
0.089*
(0.041)
-0.077
(0.053)
0.01
(0.011)
-4.217***
(0.423)
Funny how time passes.
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